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Abstract
17 USC Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits circumventing a technological protection measure 
(TPM) that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work. In the name of mitigating the 
innocent casualties of this new ban, Congress constructed a triennial rulemaking, administered 
by the Register of Copyrights, to determine temporary exemptions. This paper considers the 
legislative history of this rulemaking, and it reports the results of a systematic content analysis of 
its 2000 and 2003 proceedings.
Inspired by the literature on political agendas, policymaking institutions, venue shifting, 
and theories of delegation, we conclude that the legislative motivations for Section 1201 were 
laundered through international treaties, obscuring the anticircumvention clause’s domestic 
origins. Further, we conclude that the exemption proceeding is constructed not to protect 
noninfringing users, but to limit courts’ ability to exonerate them via the traditional defenses to 
copyright infringement. 
We then conduct a content analysis of the first two proceedings, conducted in 2000 and 
2003. Exemption proponents generally interpret the law’s intent in terms of policy goals such as 
fair use, whereas opponents see jurisdictional, procedural, and definitional obstacles to the 
granting of exemptions. The Register of Copyrights’ interpretation of the law closely resembles 
that of opponents and, on more than one key point, she refers proponents back to Congress. We 
conclude that the Register has constructed a venue that is hostile to the interests of noninfringing 
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users; in light of congressional rhetoric to the contrary, this constructs a catch-22 for many who 
earnestly wish to engage in otherwise legal activities. 
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I. Introduction
In the decade preceding widespread adoption of the Internet, copyright law was of limited 
interest to the general public; today, however, copyright debates have punctured “the bubble of 
public consciousness and become important global policy questions.”1 As in the past, this 
upswing in copyright’s visibility comes largely in the wake of a disruptive technology. While 
Napster played a vital role in bringing these issues to light,2 and the attending MGM v. Grokster3
decision has received much press, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)4 is more 
likely to have a profound, lasting impact on the development and use of copyrighted content and 
technology in the coming century. Thus far, it has been the most important of the few dozen 
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976.5 The most important section is the ban on the 
circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs) of digital content,6 embodied in 
Section 1201.7
88
1 Siva Vaidhyanathan, The State of Copyright Activism, 9 FIRST MONDAY n. 4, ¶ 1 (April 2004), 
at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_4/siva/index.html.
2 See generally, Tom McCourt & Patrick Burkart, When Creators, Corporations and Consumers 
Collide: Napster and the Development of On-line music distribution, 25 MEDIA, CULTURE AND 
SOC’Y, 333, 333-350 (2003); see also, Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: 
The DMCA's Push to Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607, 609 (2001).
3 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
4 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter D.M.C.A.].
5 See David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 
US 401, 402 (1999).
6 David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 673, 675 (2000). We acknowledge that the phrase “Digital Rights Management,” or DRM, 
is more commonly used than is TPM. We are reluctant to embrace the term DRM, however, 
since it begs the question of whether copyright holders are protecting something to which they 
have a legal right of monopoly. We therefore embrace a less commonly used—but less loaded—
term to embrace the same concept. An additional argument suggests that DRM controls far more 
than initial access and copying, but all manners of access, use, and purchase of cultural materials. 
See, e.g., Tarlton Gillespie, Copyright and Commerce: The DMCA, Trusted Systems, and the 
Stabilization of Distribution, 20 THE INFO. SOC’Y 239, 243-245 (2004) (discussing how the plans 
of DRM schemes such as “trusted” devices involve a total lockdown of all uses of media 
content). See also Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY 
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The statute enacts three separate anticircumvention bans. The basic ban prohibits 
circumventing a TPM to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted works.8 The other two bans are 
on trafficking in tools that effectuate the circumvention of a TPM that controls access to works9
or limits certain uses (e.g., copying).10 While there are statutory exemptions from one, two, or all 
three prohibitions,11 the traditional defenses to charges of infringement, including fair use,12 do 
not apply. Instead, the bill establishes a triennial assessment of the impact of the basic ban on the 
users of copyrighted works, giving the Librarian of Congress—upon the recommendations of the 
Register of Copyrights—the power to grant three-year exemptions to the basic ban.13 An 
assessment of the legislative origins and inner workings of this process is the focus of this paper. 
To facilitate this determination, the Register conducts a rulemaking to consider whether 
any exemptions to the basic ban are appropriate and what those should be.14 This is a significant 
deviation from the previous role of Copyright Office rulings, which have historically considered 
only technical matters,15 leaving interpretation of issues such as fair use to the courts.16 An 
analysis of these hearings should help to illustrate the ways in which policy actors attempt to 
TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (discussing how copyright holders use technology to help themselves to 
more protection than traditional copyright law).
7 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
8 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
9 Id.  § 1201(a)(2).
10 Id.  § 1201(b).
11 Id.  § 1201(e).
12 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
13 17 U.S.C.  § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2004).
14 E.g., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies: Notice of Inquiry, 57 Fed. Reg. 63,578 (October 15, 2002). This hearing 
process only determines exemptions to the basic ban; the only exemptions to the two trafficking 
bans are permanently enshrouded in the statute, as discussed below.
15 Nimmer, supra note 6, at 697.
16 Id., at 696.
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shape the experience of law outside the traditional venues in which the copyright bargain has 
been negotiated in the past.17 
In this paper, we review the legislative history of section 1201 generally and the triennial 
rulemaking procedure specifically. We conclude that the rulemaking is best conceptualized as a 
vehicle for reducing the role of the courts—and of fair use—in the digital millennium. We also 
report the results of a content analysis of the stakeholder input provided in response to the 
solicitations for testimony and initial rulings as well as the final rulings. While this rich data set 
could be examined from a number of vantage points, we focus our analysis on the lively debates 
regarding legislative intent and the rules of the game in this new venue. Due to the novelty of 
these proceedings, and the importance of these rules to the determination of policy outcomes, 
many of these issues are still up for debate. This content analysis further buttresses our reading 
of the legislative history: the rulemaking procedure does not appear to be an earnest attempt to 
provide meaningful relief to adversely affected noninfringing users. 
 In Part II, we combine the literatures on political agendas, policymaking institutions and 
venue shifting, and theories of delegation as a basis for examining the instant case. In Part III, we 
discuss the legislative history of section 1201 specifically. While at least two noted authors did 
so in advance of the first rulemaking,18 we provide further detail on both the legislative history 
generally and the triennial rulemaking procedure specifically. In Part IV, we present the results 
of an empirical content analysis of written submissions, oral testimony, and the final rulings, 
focusing especially on discourse about the rules of the game; to our knowledge, nothing like this 
88
17 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 57-63 (2001).
18 Nimmer, supra note 6, and Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 415-426 
(1999).
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project has been published to date.19 Finally, in Part V, we draw conclusions about the impact of 
this strategic venue shift on the public interests associated with fair use. 
II. Policy Formation and Change 
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones have explored the ways in which public policy 
agendas have shifted over time in an attempt to understand the ways in which power and 
influence over the process has been exercised. They have paid particular attention the role that 
ideas and their articulations have played in the periodic rise and fall of support for policies and 
practices on the national agenda.20 
Among the insights we derived from their work is that the institutional structure of the 
policy process, not unlike the structure of the capitalist market, is shaped by the presence of 
monopoly power. While these “policy monopolies” are unstable, as a pluralist version of 
democratic theory would demand, understanding the ways in which these monopolies rise and 
88
19 The only study we have discovered that even takes the triennial rulemaking as its primary 
object of study is Woodrow Neal Hartzog, Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the “Fail-Safe” Triennial 
Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective In Protecting Fair Use?, 
12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2005). While Hartzog’s reasoned analysis of the proceedings’ 
inefficacy is fairly on-point, his article, like any first, leaves much to say on the subject. It 
provides little discussion of the political process that led to the triennial proceedings—a peculiar 
shift of venue that we discuss in moderate detail. By Hartzog’s own admission, he does little to 
dissect the reasoning behind specific exemptions, and even less to dissect the reasoning behind 
specific denials of requests for exemptions. Id. at 329. We do so somewhat more fully while 
acknowledging that the 2003 Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights alone is 198 pages 
long. The starkest difference between his paper and ours, however, is the relative detail with 
which each discusses the written and oral testimony. Hartzog cites just 3 such documents. We 
conducted computer-aided searches of 466 documents, and we manually coded 110 of those; 
witness testimony made up the vast majority. By comparing and contrasting this testimony with 
the final rulings, we believe that our systematic investigation therefore offers unique insight into 
the hearings.
20 See generally, FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1993).
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fall in response to other changes in the socio-technical system21 is part of the challenge that 
Baumgartner and Jones help us to meet.  
Among the most important insights that we have derived from this work is the fact that 
policy entrepreneurs tend to seek out alternative venues within the policy environment in which 
they believe that a competitive policy frame can be established as the basis for a swing in the 
direction of preferred policy alternatives.22 We believe that the same processes and strategic 
moves that Baumgartner and Jones observed with regard to a broad range of problems and socio-
technical systems can be observed with regard to the so-called “digital dilemma” of intellectual 
property,23 not least of all because of the unusual shift of venue from the Legislature and the 
courts to the Library of Congress. 
A. Agendas 
A central goal of a policy management initiative is the establishment of a rank-ordered 
set of priorities or concerns. Setting the policy agenda is the equivalent of setting the terms of 
debate in ways that privilege one side and burden the other. The identification of the most 
important parties, institutions, or values at risk, or the benefits to be achieved is the first priority 
of a policy entrepreneur. A critical aspect of the struggle to establish the policy agenda is the 
characterization of interested parties or stakeholders. The list of stakeholders that have been 
88
21 This is a reference to theoretical developments in the analysis of long-term social change 
derived from the insights of Joseph Schumpeter. See PASCHAL PRESTON, RESHAPING 
COMMUNICATIONS 124-132 (2001).
22 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 20, at 237-243. See also Hernan Galperin, Beyond 
Interests, Ideas and Technology: An Institutional Approach to Communication and Information 
Policy, 20 THE INFO. SOC’Y 159, 162-164 (2004) (discussing the conceptual framework of new 
institutionalist analysis and its applicability in the analysis of telecommunications and media 
governance), and Ian Hosein, The Sources of Laws: Policy Dynamics in a Digital and Terrorized 
World, 20 THE INFO. SOC’Y 187, 188 (2004) (discussing international policy dynamics).
23 COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 318-321 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
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identified as having common or competing interests in the outcome of contemporary debates 
about intellectual property in a digital age24 is far more extensive than one might infer from the 
list of issues and concerns that have been discussed in Congress and the mainstream press. 
It is important to distinguish between the interests and concerns of those we might 
identify as the “creators of intellectual property” and those whose wellbeing is tied up in its 
distribution and sale. There are also significant differences among those whom we might identify 
as users and their agents. The interests of the general public are rather poorly defined, and until 
quite recently, these interests were assumed to have been represented by the members of the 
academic community, librarians, or coalitions of consumer equipment manufacturers.25 Although 
the growth in the number of public interest organizations concerned with communications and 
information policies has been substantial, it has leveled off, rather than increased during the 
period of critical policy change we associate with the rise of the internet.26 What has changed, 
however, is the tendency of these organizations to be concerned more with economic aspects of 
policy than with traditional concerns about content and representation.27 
It is also important for strategic reasons to be able to characterize the interests of some 
stakeholders as being illegitimate, or as unworthy of serious consideration. Such an approach is 
common within policy debates where the interests of individuals are to be balanced against some 
constructions of “the common good.”28 Of course, it is not only the stakeholders and their 
88
24 DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 65-75.
25 LITMAN, supra note 17, at 124.
26 Milton Meuller, Christiane Page & Brenden Kuerbis, Civil Society and the Shaping of 
Communication-Information Policy: Four Decades of Advocacy, 20 INFO. SOC. 169, 177 (2004).
27 Id. at 183.
28 AMAITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY, 4 (1999).
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characterizations that determine the character of policy debates and their ultimate consequences; 
it also matters where these debates unfold.29 
B. Institutional Arrangements 
Baumgartner and Jones suggest that policymakers not only attempt to frame issues and 
set the agendas for action, but they also seek to influence the selection of venues in which those 
issues will be debated.30 Policy actors have an incentive to move policy debates to those arenas 
in which they can exercise a competitive advantage that they may have developed or can expect 
to acquire, perhaps with the assistance of emerging coalition of interested parties. Coalition 
members may engage actively in “venue shopping” as a matter of political strategy, or in 
response to altered conceptualization of the interests at stake.31 
There is yet another strategy that may govern the emergence of policy venues in ways 
designed to hide exercise of power and influence. Policy laundering is a term that describes 
efforts by policy actors to have policy initiatives seen as exogenously determined, even as 
requirements imposed by powerful others. The United States and the United Kingdom are 
identified as policy actors that routinely push for the establishment of regulatory standards in 
international policy venues so that domestic policies can be brought into line with those policies 
“under the requirement of harmonization and the guise of multilateralism.”32 
While members of the copyright industries have long exercised considerable power 
within the traditional domains of copyright policymaking,33 the recent involvement of additional 
88
29 See, e.g., HERNAN GALPERIN, NEW TELEVISION, OLD POLITICS, at 251 (2004) (discussing the 
ways in which the structural features of policy environments shape the opportunities for the 
exercise of power).
30 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 20, at 35.
31 See generally, Sarah Pralle, Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The 
Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy. 23 JNL. PUB. POL 233-260 (2003).
32 Hosein, supra note 22 at 189.
33LITMAn, supra note 17, at 138.
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stakeholders, including consumers and their advocates, has led the industry to seek additional 
venues where their influence is also likely to be substantial.34 The increasing significance of the 
international policy arena, including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), has 
increased the number and value of new policy venues that are available to advocates of strong 
copyright laws.35 We discuss the relationship between these venues and the DMCA in further 
detail below. 
C. Theories of Delegation 
While it is difficult to determine precisely why a legislature may delegate responsibility 
to an agency,36 Hazlett and Spitzer offer a number of worthwhile theories. They include: 
“[d]elegation as an efficient and expert pursuit of the public interest,”37 which trusts agencies to 
solve complex policy issues and future political developments. “Delegation as an aid to rent 
extraction”38 implies that politicians use regulation either as a tool to create rents or as a threat 
with which to extract rents (in the form of contributions). Further, delegation can assist in 
“solving the collective action problem in Congress.”39 Congressional decision-making is 
inefficient, especially as a means of writing detailed legislation. Yet opting for the simpler route 
88
34 Id. at 144. LITMAN suggests that the assignment of rulemaking responsibility to the “Librarian 
of Congress in consultation with the Copyright Office and the Commerce Department” would 
preserve both “Commerce and Judiciary Committee jurisdiction and the associated generous 
campaign contributions.” 
35 See David Bach, The Double Punch of Law and Technology: Fighting Music Piracy or 
Remaking Copyright in a Digital Age? 6 BUS. &POL., 18-22 (Article 3, Issue 2, 2004), at 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol6/iss2/art3 (discussing international venue shopping).
36 Mark A. Pollack, Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of 
Delegation, 25 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 1 , 200-219 at 216 (January 2002).
37 Thomas W. Hazlett and Matthew L. Spitzer (2000) "Digital Television and the Quid Pro 
Quo",  Business and Politics (Online Version): Vol. 2: No. 2, Article 2, at 135. Available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol2/iss2/art2 at 135
38 Id. at 136.
39 Id. at 136.
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of delegation may lead to runaway agency policymaking.40 One final reason for delegation is to 
facilitate “credit claiming and blame shirking.”41 This most clearly comes into play when the 
interests of those who gain from the policy enacted via delegation are concentrated, but the 
interests of those who lose from the same policy are diffuse. 
Hazlett & Spitzer illustrate credit claiming and blame shirking by using this theory to 
explain continued Congressional delegation of the power to regulate broadcasters to the FCC, 
even though the Commission is “universally held to have failed to deliver the positive side of the 
bargain with the public.”42 Broadcasters have very clear, powerful, and concentrated interests in 
retaining a system that purports to extract broadcast programming with strong public service 
components, fails to extract it, and yet continues to deliver free monopoly licenses to 
broadcasters. Congress can therefore publicly flog the FCC for failing to do its job—shirking 
public blame—and yet quietly claim political credit with broadcasters who better understand 
Congress’s role.43 If conducted to facilitate credit claiming and blame shirking, delegation is a 
homegrown means of effecting policy laundering; members of Congress can launder their 
choices through another government organ, hiding this from the broader public but cashing in 
goodwill with concentrated political interests.
88
40 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST 
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS, 49 (1999).
41 Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 140.
42 Id. at 141.
43 Id. at 142. 
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III. The Path to Section 1201 
The route to the final version of section 1201 is worth recounting because this history 
reveals a great deal about how we arrived at the final product. A great deal of the debate in the 
first two exemption proceedings revolves around legislative intent. One side insists that the 
proceedings are designed primarily to preserve any reasonably constructed fair use claims, while 
the other envisions them as, at best, a solution to a medium-specific worst-case scenario designed 
only to ameliorate the worst pay-per-use scenarios. It is only in understanding the political push 
behind the legislation generally, and the exemption proceeding specifically, that we can begin to 
make sense of the proceedings’ inner workings. 
In the first, briefest subsection, we discuss the internationalized push for reform by Patent 
Commissioner Bruce A. Lehman; this push demonstrates the interplay of venues and sets up the 
mechanics of the policy laundering that followed. Second, we detail the bill as originally 
proposed, including a somewhat fuller discussion of the three bans. Third, we examine the two 
House subcommittee hearings that followed; they speak loudly to the means by which Congress 
crafts copyright law. Fourth, we consider the evolving versions of section 1201. Finally, we 
discuss the legislative history of the triennial proceedings established to determine exemptions to 
the basic ban. 
A. Lehman’s (Shopping) Wish List 
 Shortly after President Clinton’s inauguration, Commissioner Lehman began working to 
deliver as much legal control as possible over digital content to copyright holders.44 Yet 
resistance quickly grew in Congress, thanks largely to the lobbying effort of groups such as the 
Digital Future Coalition.45 During this time, Lehman was also trying to build international 
88
44 LITMAN, supra note 17, at 90-91 (2000).
45 Id. at 124-125.
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support for a treaty that could leverage stricter copyright law into the rest of the world’s law 
books.46 
The domestic legislation, however, was not moving. The commissioner, therefore, 
decided to attack the problem the other way around. He focused his attention on getting 
his agenda adopted by the WIPO member nations, reasoning that when the United States 
signed the treaty, Congress would be obliged to adopt implementing legislation...47 
In the end, even though the final language of the WIPO Copyright Treaty48 (WCT) was much 
weaker than Lehman had hoped,49 it contained a new anticircumvention provision that was “used 
as a basis for greatly enhanced copyright owner control.”50 The Treaty requires that countries 
have "adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures,”51 but US law arguably met this standard. It was already illegal 
to circumvent TPMs if conducted as part of a copyright infringement, and manufacturers of 
“black box” devices that only served to circumvent TPMs had already been subjected to legal 
liability for facilitating infringement.52 The “Clinton Administration initially considered whether 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty might even be sent to the Senate for ratification ‘clean’ of 
implementing legislation.”53 Instead, Congress used the Treaty as an excuse to implement a 
much more sweeping ban on circumvention. In short, Lehman and the bill’s congressional 
supporters used WIPO to launder their own interests, running their political capital through the 
88
46 Id. at 129.
47 Id. at 129.
48 WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996).
49 Litman, supra note 17, at 129.
50 Id. at 131.
51 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 48, art. 11.
52 Litman, supra note 17, at 131.
53 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 530 (1999).
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bank of international credibility and treating the final bill as something required by international 
law. 
B. Original Bill 
 Section 1201 implements three different bans. These three bans are the bulk of a much 
briefer section in the bill as introduced, and they find their way into the final version with only 
minor edits. The first ban (or the “basic ban”) prohibits circumventing a TPM to gain 
unauthorized access to copyrighted works. “No person shall circumvent a technological 
protection measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”54 For 
example, it is a violation of this provision to defeat a software installer’s requirement for a 
unique serial number. While doing so for the purpose of infringing a copyright was already 
illegal, this clause bans it for any reason—even if one has misplaced the serial number for a 
legally purchased software package and intends to install it on just one computer.55 Even a 
librarian who wants only to preserve a decaying digital artifact is prohibiting from circumventing 
an access-controlling TPM to do so. 
The second ban prohibits manufacturing, importing, and trafficking in tools that would 
assist one in the type of behavior prohibited by the basic ban.56 This ban (herein, the “access 
trafficking ban”) prohibits computer-repair services from assisting a librarian in the above 
scenario, and it prohibits librarians from developing a technology to facilitate circumventions. 
The third ban (the “additional violations ban”) prohibits trafficking in the tools to facilitate the 
circumvention of a TPM that protects any copyright holder’s right, notably the exclusive right of 
88
54 H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 1201(a)(1) (1997). The final version, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) 
(2004), omits the word “protection.”
55 The final statute offers a potential defense, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2004), which permits reverse 
engineering to achieve interoperability between software programs. 
56 H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 1201(a)(2) (1997). The final version is codified 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(2) (2004). 
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reproduction.57 An example of a technology that would violate this ban is a program that defeats 
a TPM that prevents the copying of some CDs; again, not even librarians can develop such a 
technology. 
The difference between the two trafficking bans comes into play in the statutory 
exemptions—and in the circumventions that are not forbidden. Omitted from the statute is any 
ban on the circumvention of use control technologies, so long as those technologies are not 
“dual-purpose” in the sense of also controlling access. For instance, 1201 does not ban the act of 
circumventing the copy-controls on a legally purchased CD, which leaves such behavior in the 
realm of prior statutory and case law. We refer to this as the “noninfringing use” exemption 
because one can legally circumvent use control technologies to engage in noninfringing uses, 
including fair uses. Yet such noninfringing uses are still difficult to achieve for most users, as it 
remains illegal to develop, sell, or market the tools to facilitate such circumvention. Even those 
who have the technical expertise to circumvent cannot circumvent dual-purpose technologies; for 
instance, since the DVD Content Scrambling System (CSS) has been found to be an access 
control technology,58 one cannot circumvent CSS to make fair use of movie clips. 
 Other than these three bans, the original bill’s section 1201 has little to say. In a section 
that was ultimately removed, it would have made the importation of circumvention-facilitating 
technologies “actionable under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337).”59 The 
bill clarifies that it does not affect any of the “rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to 
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”60 This “savings clause” makes it 
88
57 Id. at 1201(b)(1). The final version is codified 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (2004). 
58 Universal Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2000).
59 H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 1201(c) (1997). 
60 Id. at 1201(d).
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through to the final version.61 The only statutory exemption in the bill is for “law enforcement 
and intelligence activities” by government agencies.62 
C. Congressional Hearings 
 In the two House Committee hearings to consider the legislation, the act’s principal 
advocates engage in substantial policy laundering. Additionally, witnesses all but explicitly agree 
that the act was designed from the very beginning to benefit the copyright industries63 (and, after 
substantial amendment, perhaps not to harm other industries too badly) at the public’s expense. 
The policy developments revealed in these hearings illustrate that, while systems matter, people 
acting within those systems also matter. 
1. Policy Laundering 
As Litman notes, Commissioner Lehman and copyright owners were sorely disappointed 
with the final WCT’s relative weaknesses, but they were determined to use the treaty’s language 
as a platform for achieving significantly stronger copyright protections.64 In House Judiciary 
subcommittee hearing,65 no fewer than six witnesses insist that the bill must be adopted quickly 
in order to ensure the quick ratification and implementation of the treaty in other countries.66 
88
61 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2004).
62 H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 1201(3) (1997).
63 The members of the copyright industries and the gross revenues reported by their individual 
sectors are identified in U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN 
DIGITAL MEDIA, at 4 (2004), available at: http://www.cba.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5736/08-
09Copyright.pdf.
64 LITMAN, supra note 17, at 129-130.
65 WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act, 
Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Judiciary Hearing].
66 Id. at 34 (statement of Hon. Bruce A. Lehman, Assist. Sec. and Comm’r of Patents and 
Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office, Dept. of Commerce), 43 (statement of Hon. 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the U.S.), 78 (statement of Jack 
Valenti, Pres. and C.E.O., Motion Picture Ass’n of Am.), 157 (statement of Allee Willis, 
songwriter, on behalf of Broadcast Music Inc.), 212 (statement of Gail Markels, General Counsel 
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Four more witnesses make the same argument in House Commerce subcommittee hearings.67 
Lehman in particular uses WIPO to justify a bill that clearly exceeds the treaties’ requirements. 
“The legislation ... is designed to permit us to adhere to these treaties and to exercise our 
appropriate leadership as the leading copyright producer in the world, in providing other 
countries with a model in about how they shall implement these treaties as well.”68 While 
questioning Lehman, Rep. Rick Boucher asks if the US could meet its treaty obligations without 
banning technologies—whether the trafficking bans are unnecessary to meet the WIPO treaties. 
Lehman dodges the question, and Boucher asks again: 
Could we meet those requirements by adopting a conduct oriented approach as opposed 
to a device oriented approach? 
MR. LEHMAN. In my personal view... the answer is yes. But in my personal view also that 
[sic] the value of the treaties would be reduced enormously, and we would be opening 
ourselves up to universal piracy of American products all over this planet.69 
Several representatives join Lehman in this laundering effort. In the Commerce Hearing, for 
instance, Rep. Bart Gordon insists, “once we pass something here, it has to go to the international 
community. ... They are really waiting for us to see what we are going to do. So whatever we do 
and Sr. V.P., Interactive Digital Software Assn.), and 218 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Exec. 
Director, Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n).
67 The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 105th Cong. (1998) 43 
(statements of Hillary B. Rosen, Pres. & C.E.O., Recording Industry Assn. of Am.), 50 
(statement of George Vradenburg III, Sr. V.P. and General Counsel, America Online, Inc., on 
behalf of the Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition), 53 (statement of Steven J. Metalitz, Smith & 
Metalitz, L.L.P., on behalf of the Motion Picture Assn. of Am.), and 37 (prepared statement of 
Robert W. Holleyman II, Pres. and C.E.O., Business Software Alliance) [hereinafter Commerce 
Hearing].
68 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 34 (statement of Hon. Bruce Lehman).
69 Id. at 62 (statement of Hon. Bruce Lehman).
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is the ceiling, not the floor.”70 This statement implicitly acknowledges what Boucher made 
Lehman say explicitly: the treaty—the “floor”—does not require such strong bans. One 
opponent, Edward J. Black, the President of the Computer and Communications Industry 
Association (CCIA), inverts the same arguments: 
[T]he administration’s bill does not represent a compromise position. It was rejected ... in 
WIPO, and we believe that it is important that legislation implementing WIPO reflect 
what really happened in WIPO. That is important. It is a precedent to the rest of the world 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property not to have people try to twist and 
distort what was done.71 
On both sides of the debate, then, stakeholders agree that the bill exceeds the treaty obligations 
and that the example we set will have international ramifications; the disagreement is whether 
that is for better or for worse. This is naked policy laundering. It is also a demonstration of 
especially effective venue shifting. Having failed at the original strategy of securing domestic 
legislation, the bill’s allies devise a very effective solution: work an international venue for as 
strict a treaty as possible, and failing to achieve much there, push domestically in the name of 
international compliance. In other words, shift venues, obscure the relative failure there, launder 
one’s interests through the bank of international credibility, and push again in the original 
venue.72 
2. Industrial Over Public Interest 
88
70 Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at 8 (statement of Hon. Bart Gordon, Member, House 
Comm. on Commerce).
71 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 257 (statement of Edward J. Black, Pres., Computer and 
Communications Industry Ass’n).
72 While this is beyond our scope here, note that the cycle continues; Rep. Gordon in particular 
alludes to the premeditated strategy of interpreting the WIPO treaties through section 1201 in the 
push for strict anticircumvention statutes in other countries. Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, 
at 8.
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In addition to this fairly explicit display of policy laundering, the path to section 1201 
demonstrates Litman’s observation that copyright law is developed primarily to benefit powerful 
vested interests.73 Each Subcommittee’s witness list helps illustrate this claim. The Judiciary 
Hearing features 25 witnesses,74 and the Commerce Hearing features 12.75 In total, 9 represent 
media industries such as music (6), movies (2), and publishing (1). A total of 15 witnesses 
represent miscellaneous high-technology sectors; this includes TPM vendors (1), Internet Service 
Providers (1), webcasters (1), software firms (6), hardware manufacturers (1), and companies or 
associations in both software and hardware (5). Telecommunications (4) and higher education 
(5) are also represented, as are intellectual property attorneys (1). These stakeholders represent 
most of the categories of participants that we identify in the triennial rulemaking. One highly 
noteworthy exemption, however, is the general public: while ordinary consumers and 
unaffiliated advanced computer users represent the greatest single group of participants in the 
exemption proceedings, they have no direct say in the congressional hearings.  
In contrast to 34 industry representatives, there are, at best, 3 government or civil society 
advocates of the public interest:76 Patent Commissioner Bruce A. Lehman,77 Register of 
88
73 LITMAN, supra note 17, at 23.
74 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at iii.
75 Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at iii.
76 Two witnesses in the Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, who offer some voice to civil society 
interests are Earlham College President Douglas Bennett, at 240, and Computer and 
Communications Industry Association President Edward J. Black, at 256. Both are also speaking 
on behalf of the Digital Future Coalition, which includes civil society nonprofits. Yet Bennett 
and Black are there not purely out of selfless devotion to the public interest. Representing 
educators and computer manufacturers, respectively, each has a clear vested interest in keeping 
copyright law from becoming too cumbersome upon their industries. Each therefore has at least 
some incentive to make a deal with copyright owners featuring concessions that are specific to 
users such as computer engineers and librarians. While we impugn neither Bennett nor Black 
specifically, we note that these industries do receive concessions in the final legislation.
77 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 34 (statement of Hon. Bruce Lehman).
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Copyrights Marybeth Peters,78 and Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
Marc Rotenberg.79 Lehman enters WIPO negotiations hoping to bring home something akin to 
H.R. 2281, and having failed at that, he uses the WCT as a rhetorical vehicle for a much more 
sweeping bill. 80 Peters is comparatively neutral, a point we will return to later, but she provides 
little if any evaluation of the bill’s ability to meet the public interest. Rotenberg, the only person 
who actually devotes his entire testimony to a consideration of the public interest, testifies 
exclusively on the need for privacy safeguards in the legislation.81 
In addition to the witness list, the explicit compromise between telecomm and media 
interests makes clear that this bill is for these industries’ benefit. Of 25 Judiciary witnesses, 18 
testify partially or entirely on H.R. 2281; the other seven testify exclusively on H.R. 2180,82 the 
Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act. The latter bill limits the liability of those who 
transmit data across networks, especially internet service providers (ISPs), for copyright 
infringements until and unless they are notified of such infringement. Bundling these two acts 
together is something of a forced compromise. Telecommunications and some technology 
companies are willing to support H.R. 2281 in exchange for 2180’s assurances that they will not 
be sued for their own behavior or that of their customers,83 and copyright interests are generally 
88
78 Id. at 43 (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters).
79 Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at 12 (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic 
Privacy and Information Center).
80 See infra Part III.A.
81 Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at 12 (statement of Marc Rotenberg).
82 H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997). The essence of this bill is tacked on as Title II of H.R. 2281, 
105th Cong. (1997). 
83 E.g., Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 83 (statement of Roy Neel, Pres., U.S. Telephone 
Ass’n) (arguing, in part, “You have to keep this liability issue coupled with the treaty 
implementation process, otherwise there is no incentive whatsoever for the content community to 
come to the table under your guidance and work out a solution here.”).
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more interested in prevention TPM circumvention.84 Of the 18 who testify on H.R. 2281, 13 are 
clearly in favor of the bill (with occasional suggestions for minor amendments),85 and only five 
offer opposition or insist on substantial amendments prior to passage.86 Of the other seven, 5 
testify on behalf of H.R. 2180,87 and 2 witnesses representing copyright holders88 oppose it. 
Nobody gets exactly what she wants, but taken together, the bill gives two major industries that 
which they desire most strongly. 
In their Commerce Hearing testimony, several witnesses allude to or explicitly state that 
the legislative compromises thus far represent the tradeoff between still further industries’ 
interests. Several witnesses prefer the Senate’s amended bill,89 which incorporates an exemption 
to protect the right to reverse-engineer software programs.90 Chris Byrne insists that the House 
88
84 E.g., id at 129 (statement of Lawrence Kenswil, Exec. V.P., Universal Music Group) (“If this 
committee concludes that [H.R. 2180] is necessary, I urge you to include incentives to ensure 
that those who link consumers to our music support copy control technology.”)
85 Id. at 34 (statement of Hon. Bruce Lehman), 43 (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters), 68 
(statement of Robert W. Holleyman II), 78 (statement of Jack Valenti, Pres. & C.E.O., Motion 
Picture Ass’n of Am.), 156 (statement of Allee Willis), 167 (statement of John Bettis, 
songwriter, on behalf of Am. Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers), 198 (statement of 
Johnny Cash, vocal artist), 200 (statement of Hilary B. Rosen, Pres. and C.E.O., Recording 
Industry Assoc. of Am.), 204 (statement of Allan R. Adler, V.P. for Legal and Gov’t Affairs, 
Ass’n of Am. Publishers), 212 (statement of Gail Markels, General Counsel and Sr. V.P., 
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n), 218 (statement of Michael K. Kirk), 224 (statement of 
Thomas Ryan, C.E.O., SciTech Software), 271 (statement of Mark S. Belinsky, V.P., Copy 
Protection Group, Macrovision Corp.), 
86 Id. at 64 (statement of M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor, Univ. of Cal. Santa Cruz), 240 
(statement of Douglas Bennett), 249 (statement of Christopher Byrne, Dir. of Intell. Prop., 
Silicon Graphics), 256 (statement of Edward J. Black), and 266 (statement of Gary J. Shapiro, 
Pres., Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Ass’n.)
87 Id. at 82 (statement of Roy Neel, Pres. & C.E.O, U.S. Telephone Ass’n), 113 (statement of 
Tushar Patel, V.P. and Managing Director, US WEB), 122 (statement of Marc Jacobsen, V.P. 
and General Counsel, Prodigy Svcs. Inc.), 148 (Statement of Robert L. Oakley, Prof. of Law, 
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.), and 172 (statement of Ronald G. Dunn, Pres., Information Industry 
Ass’n).
88 Id. at 116 (statement of Ken Wasch, Pres., Software Publishers Ass’n) and 128 (statement of 
Lawrence Kenswil, Exec. V.P., Bus. and Legal Affairs, Universal Music Group). 
89 S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998). See also S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998).
90 § 1201(g), S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 88.
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adopt the amendments incorporated into the Senate version91 so that information technology 
companies can “keep the lawyers out of the R&D labs.”92 Walter H. Hinton commends the 
Senate bill’s “compromise position on reverse engineering that CCIA negotiated with the 
Business Software Alliance. ... This represents a fair and balanced solution that required long 
hours of intense negotiations.”93 George Vradenburg III also heaps praise upon the Senate 
compromise, which incorporates limitations on internet service providers’ liability that are 
similar to those found in H.R. 2180.94 “The product of 2 years of effort and conversations 
between the copyright community on the one hand and the Internet community on the other, it is 
in fact a delicate balance of what are strongly contending forces, but nevertheless, now 
cooperative forces in how to build out the Internet.”95 These statements support Litman’s 
observation that industry players hash out copyright legislation among themselves; they even 
suggest that, since the negotiations are largely done, Congress just has to sign on the dotted line. 
3. Policy Actors 
 The behavior of almost all of these witnesses is fully predictable. Educators, ISPs, and 
non-software technology firms want less liability for copyright infringement; software and media 
interests want more. A few political actors, however, can make a significant difference. Three are 
worth noting: Lehman, Peters, and Boucher. Commissioner Lehman is a powerful ally for those 
who support H.R. 2281; we have already discussed his international push for the bill. 
Representative Boucher is among the original bill’s most vocal opponents, and as the 
only member of both subcommittees, he is uniquely placed to lodge that opposition. In the 
88
91 Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at 34 (prepared statement of Chris Byrne).
92 Id. at 31 (statement of Chris Byrne).
93 Id. at 49 (statement of Walter H. Hinton, V.P., Strategy and Marketing Enterprise Operations, 
Storage Technology Corp., on behalf of the Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n).
94 See S.REP. NO. 105-190 (1998), at 78.
95 Id. at 50 (statement of George Vradenburg III).
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Judiciary Hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Coble, who sponsored the bill,96 attempts at the 
beginning of each day to minimize the number of opening statements; in both instances, Boucher 
insists on beginning each day’s proceedings with an opening statement that raises serious doubts 
about the bill.97 In his statement to begin the second day, Boucher insists that the WIPO treaties 
do not require the bill’s trafficking bans, and he expresses concerns that the bill will chill the 
development of new technologies and the exercise of fair use.98 Boucher’s most remarkable 
maneuver, however, is the introduction of a competing bill, H.R. 3048,99 which draws 53 
cosponsors. This bill’s anticircumvention provision reads as follows: 
No person, for the purpose of facilitating or engaging in an act of infringement, shall 
engage in conduct so as knowingly to remove, deactivate or otherwise circumvent the 
application or operation of any effective technological measure used by a copyright 
owner to preclude or limit reproduction of a work or a portion thereof. As used in this 
subsection, the term `conduct' does not include manufacturing, importing or distributing a 
device or a computer program.100 
This alternative ties the basic ban to copyright infringement, and it explicitly precludes any ban 
on trafficking in circumvention devices. While the final language of H.R. 2281 changes little in 
this direction, Boucher’s alternative gives significant rhetorical leverage to those who oppose 
2281’s sweeping language.101 We believe this facilitates the addition of several statutory 
exemptions and the triennial rulemaking process. 
88
96 H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998).
97 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 27, 191 (statements of Hon. Rick Boucher, Member, 
House Comm. on Judiciary).
98 Id. at 192.
99 H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997).
100 Id. at §1201(a).
101 E.g., Commerce Hearing, supra note 67, at 46 (statement of Walter H. Hinton) (“First, I 
would like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation to Congressman Rick Boucher 
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In addition to Lehman and Boucher, we consider one final policy actor: Register of 
Copyrights Marybeth Peters. Peters’ congressional testimony is of particular value in 
understanding the triennial proceedings that she eventually comes to administer. In her 
testimony, Peters hints at the degree to which she does not speak for the public. Litman notes 
that this is, in principle, her job. “Unfortunately, the Copyright Office has tended to view 
copyright owners as its real constituency, and has spent the past ten years moving firmly into the 
content industry’s pocket. ... [T]he Register has routinely given positions advanced by the 
content industry her enthusiastic endorsement.”102 On the whole, Peters’ testimony meets this 
general prediction. Her position on the bill is very supportive. “The Copyright Office urges 
prompt ratification of these treaties, and supports H.R. 2281 generally. In our view the bill fully 
and adequately implements the obligations of the treaties, without amending the law in areas 
where a change is not required for implementation.”103 
Despite this general enthusiasm, she is less of an unabashed cheerleader than Lehman. 
She testifies that her office’s overall support “does not mean that we see the language of these 
provisions as perfect. ... The anti-circumvention provision in particular has raised concerns as to 
its scope and impact, and may need further refinement. On this and other issues we remain 
willing to assist the Committee.”104 Peters also provides an in-depth discussion of common 
concerns with the bill. While insisting that the bans on circumvention technologies are necessary 
for the bill to be effective, she clearly states that they are not per se required by the WCT and 
that she would be happy to offer guidance on how to reduce the statute’s potential impact on 
who, along with Congressman Tom Campbell, had the vision to introduce H.R. 3048 as an 
alternative to H.R. 2281. The Boucher bill represents a thoughtful and intelligent approach...”).
102 LITMAN, supra note 17, at 74.
103 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 43 (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters).
104 Id. at 44.
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socially desirable products.105 She also provides an in-depth discussion of the bill’s “potential 
impact on fair use interests.”106 
Cautious tone aside, however, Peters clearly uses her position to support the bill as 
written. In her written statement, she offers two reasons that the bill adequately preserves fair 
use. “First, it ... does not contain a prohibition against individual acts of circumvention of”107 
use-controlling TPMs. “Section 1201 has therefore been analogized to the equivalent of a law 
against breaking and entering. Under existing law, it is not permissible to break into a locked 
room in order to make fair use of a manuscript kept inside.” 108 Yet Peters acknowledges that the 
bill may foster business models predicated on forcing customers through access controls in order 
to make any uses, denying them the capacity to make fair uses, and distributing certain works 
only in encrypted electronic formats.109 She admits that the law may place technologies that 
facilitate noninfringing uses beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.110 Rather than pushing to 
amend the current bill to avoid these possibilities, Peters seems willing to accept the risk that 
market developments will obviate fair use because future legislatures can amend the bill later.111 
Second, she argues that the bill preserves fair use because “it contains a savings clause 
that explicitly preserves fair use and other exemptions to rights in the Copyright Act.”112 While 
88
105 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 48-49 (prepared statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters).
106 Id. at 48.
107 Id. at 49.
108 Id. at 49. This last point is not necessarily true. To our knowledge, there are few if any laws 
against breaking into a room per se. If one has legally purchased the lock, the room, and the 
manuscript, breaking into the room would be perfectly legal—the objections of MasterLock 
notwithstanding. Yet if one buys a Region 1 DVD player and a Region 2 DVD that is 
unavailable in Region 1 format, it is illegal to tamper with the player in an effort to get it to 
access the contents of the DVD. On this count, at least, section 1201 gives copyright holders 
rights that supercede ownership rights in physical property.
109 Id. at 49.
110 Id. at 49.
111 See id. at 50.
112 Id. at 49.
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this clause113 “may eliminate the possibility of an unclean hands-type argument in an 
infringement case,”114 this provides no defense against charges of illegal circumvention: 
[T]he clause does not establish fair use as a defense to the violation of section 1201 in 
itself. ... While the clause might be read by a court as a signal to extend the concept of 
fair use as a judge-made defense, it does not provide clear legislative authority to do 
so.115 
To imply that the bill does no harm to fair use interests because of the savings clause, even 
though fair use is no defense for violating section 1201, is disingenuous at best. Further, Peters 
discusses a possible judicial construction to the contrary in such a way as to reduce that 
possibility and alert the bill’s advocates to such unintended consequences. Peters’ congressional 
testimony provides additional support for Litman’s observation that the copyright office is very 
friendly to the copyright industries. 
88
113 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2004). (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”)
114 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 65, at 50 (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters) (As examples 
of “unclean hands” cases, Peters offers, “Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 563 (1985) (weighing in the fair use balance the bad faith of the defendant in gaining 
unauthorized access to the plaintiff’s work) and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832, 
843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).”).
115 Id. at 50.
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D. Adding the Triennial Proceedings 
 To some, the recurring procedure to determine exemptions may appear to be intended as 
an equitable solution to the harms to noninfringing uses created by TPMs. We strongly disagree. 
The appearance and evolution of the statutory provision for the hearings, as well as the reasoning 
behind each maneuver, help illustrate that most members of Congress were far more concerned 
with protecting the interests of copyright holders than with protecting fair use in the digital 
millennium. 
1. Commerce Version 
 As the bill worked its way through Congress, each committee left enough of a mark until 
the final array of statutory bans and exemptions was erratic, irrational, and confusing.116 While 
the full tale of the bill’s passage is worth telling, that is not our mission here. The most 
remarkable amendment to the original legislation—and the object of our study—is the 
appearance of a recurring administrative proceeding to determine exemptions to the basic ban. 
This first appears in the House Commerce Committee version of the bill: 
(B) During the 2-year period described in subparagraph (A), and in each succeeding 2-
year period, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Communications and Information, the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, and the Register of Copyrights, shall conduct a rulemaking on the record to 
determine whether users of copyrighted works have been, or are likely to be in the 
succeeding 2-year period, adversely affected by the implementation of [access-
controlling TPMs] in their ability to make lawful uses ... of copyrighted works. In 
conducting such rulemaking, the Secretary shall examine— 
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;  
88
116 See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 675.
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(ii) the availability for use of works for archival, preservation, and educational  purposes;  
(iii) the impact of the application of technological protection measures to copyrighted 
works on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; 
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological protection measures on the market for or 
value of copyrighted works; and 
(v) such other factors as the Secretary, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Communications and Information, the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, and the Register of Copyrights, considers appropriate.117 
Based on this rulemaking, subparagraph (C) dictates, the Secretary determines the “particular 
class[es] of works” for which “lawful uses have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected” and 
waives the basic ban’s applicability to those classes “for the ensuing 2-year period.”118 
This provision is noteworthy on several counts. First, it gives control of the proceedings 
to the Secretary of Commerce, who is not particularly knowledgeable about copyright law. We 
take this to be a patent example of delegation as an aid to rent seeking. Second, the rulemaking 
asks the Secretary to balance the competing interests at stake—including especially access to 
noninfringing uses such as criticism and scholarship and the effect of circumvention on the 
market value of TPM-protected works. Third, the statute gives tremendous leeway to the 
Secretary in determining the rules and procedures for the hearing, even granting a license to 
consider whatever factors she deems appropriate in weighing proposed exemptions. This implies 
either a deep trust of the Secretary or a significant obstacle to collective action in the 
Committee.119 
88
117 H.REP. NO. 105-551, Pt. 2, at 2-3 (1998).
118 Id. at 3.
119 The final committee report does offer some further guidance on the rulemaking, discussed 
below. See infra Part III.D.2. 
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Fourth, despite the broad leeway in determining exemptions from the basic ban, it 
specifically precludes the Secretary from examining either trafficking ban. If the trafficking bans 
are effective and circumvention devices are unavailable, exemptions are effectively useless for 
those without the technical skill to circumvent TPMs. 
Fifth, it more or less ties exemptions to specific classes of works rather than specific 
users or uses.120 As Nimmer explains:  
If users of physics textbooks or listeners to Baroque concerti, for example, find 
themselves constricted in the new Internet environment, then some relief will lie. If, on 
the other hand, the only problem shared by numerous disgruntled users is that each is 
having trouble accessing copyrighted works, albeit of different genres, no relief is 
warranted.121 
This class-based relief fits poorly with several important, longstanding statutory exemptions to 
copyright that are based largely on the user or intended use.122 
Finally, the proceedings grant an unusual power to an administrative agency. Exemptions 
to copyright law are generally adjudicated post hoc in federal courts. Agency rulings on 
copyright law have historically considered only technical matters,123 and the Copyright Office, 
which reports to Congress, is historically granted jurisdiction. Despite vague resemblance to the 
88
120 While the statute is regrettably ambiguous on this point, we believe it is most reasonably 
read as containing a clear and substantial shift from the use- or user-based statutory exemptions 
that are the norm in copyright law.
121 Nimmer, supra note 6, at 695.
122 E.g. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (permitting the fair use of any copyrighted work “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research”), 17 U.S.C. § 108 
(granting librarians and archivists the right to make copies of any type of materials under certain 
circumstances), and 17 U.S.C. § 110 (permitting the use of any copyrighted materials in teaching 
under certain circumstances). 
123 Nimmer, supra note 6, at 696-698.
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four-factor fair use test,124 the bill reclaims territory from longstanding judicial delegations, turns 
post hoc tradition around, and asks the Secretary to make exemptions prospectively. In light of 
judicial willingness to recognize exceptions to copyright such as fair use,125 this venue shift is 
troubling for the defenders of noninfringing uses.
The move to an administrative hearing is another example of how “the anti-
circumvention provisions ... prevent courts from engaging in fair use analysis. Indeed, as 
technology becomes the primary means of protecting content, courts (and the constitutional 
limits on copyright) are removed entirely.”126 For those who support increasingly strong 
copyright legislation, federal judges are untrustworthy agents, and federal court is an unsafe 
venue. Drawing on Epstein and O’Halloran,127 these interests would likely describe federal 
judges as runaway agencies. In contrast, if Lehman’s congressional testimony is any indicator of 
the views of the Department of Commerce, this new venue will be very cozy for copyright 
holders and a serious threat to the ability of users to circumvent TPMs for noninfringing uses. 
2. Commerce Committee’s Reasoning
In its final report,128 the House Committee on Commerce offers a reasonably detailed 
rationale for its decision to insert a regular review of the basic ban. Due to digital media 
technology, especially the internet, the public has enjoyed dramatically increased access to a 
dizzying amount and variety of copyrighted materials:
Still, the Committee is concerned that marketplace realities may someday dictate a 
different outcome, resulting in less access, rather than more, to copyrighted materials that 
88
124 17 U.S.C. § 107.
125 Id. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Amica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
126 Jackson, supra note 2, at 639.
127 Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 40.
128 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998). 
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are important to education, scholarship, and other socially vital endeavors. This result 
could flow from a confluence of factors, including the elimination of print or other hard-
copy versions, the permanent encryption of all electronic copies, and the adoption of 
business models that depend upon restricting distribution and availability, rather than 
upon maximizing it. ... Given the threat of a diminution of otherwise lawful access to 
works and information, the Committee on Commerce believes that a ‘‘fail-safe’’ 
mechanism is required.129 
The above paragraph contains several noteworthy examples of flawed reasoning. First, the 
Committee acknowledges that the pre-DMCA status quo has produced an explosion of access to 
digitized materials. This hardly provides a compelling imperative to provide strong legal 
protections for TPMs. Second, the major marketplace development the Committee seeks to avoid 
comes not from uninhibited access to materials secured only by TPMs, but from monopolistic 
marketplace strategies enabled by the categorical ban on circumvention. The worst-case scenario 
results from the legislative “solution.” Third and finally, the Committee claims to have devised a 
“fail-safe,” but the legislation deliberately eliminates the usual fail-safe: judicial oversight, 
including the capacity for post hoc corrections of would-be miscarriages of justice. In sum, the 
reasoning behind this new proceeding belies the poorly articulated justifications for the strong 
ban it leaves in place. The new law may do awful things, the Committee acknowledges, but they 
allow a minor amendment at best. 
 The Committee report also provides more guidance regarding the rulemaking than does 
the proposed statutory text. The report details: 
[T]he rulemaking proceeding should focus on distinct, verifiable and measurable impacts; 
should not be based upon de minimis impacts; and will solicit input to consider a broad 
88
129 Id. at 36.
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range of evidence of past or likely adverse impacts. The criteria listed in subparagraph 
(B) are illustrative of the questions that the rulemaking proceeding should ask. In each 
case, the focus must remain on whether the implementation of technological protection 
measures (such as encryption or scrambling) has caused adverse impact on the ability of 
users to make lawful uses. ... In conducting the rulemaking proceeding, the Secretary 
must consult closely with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, as well as with the Patent and Trademark Office and the Register of 
Copyrights.130 
While this clearly places the burden of proof on those who propose exemptions, it does not 
represent that burden as particularly high: 
If the rulemaking has produced insufficient evidence to determine whether there have 
been adverse impacts with respect to particular classes of copyrighted materials, the 
circumvention prohibition should go into effect with respect to those classes. Only in 
categories as to which the Secretary finds that adverse impacts have occurred, or that 
such impacts are likely to occur within the next two years, should he or she waive the 
applicability of the regulations for the next two years.131 
This language focuses on the positive existence of such a burden of proof. Yet it implies that 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate adverse impacts will lead to an exemption. The statute 
counterbalances this with factors such as “the effect of circumvention of technological protection 
measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works,”132 but nowhere does the Committee 
or the statute imply that the burden for proving adverse effect is particularly high or difficult to 
meet. 
88
130 Id. at 37.
131 Id. at 38.
132 Id. at 2.
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Even so, not every member of the Committee finds this amendment adequate. In an 
addendum to the report,133 Representatives Scott Klug and Rick Boucher commend the value of 
the amendments but express sincere reservations about the bill that remains. They attempt to re-
reframe the debate, drawing on constitutional and judicial language that demands a limited 
copyright targeted more toward social benefit than private rent seeking.134 Yet their tale of 
attempting to implement a fair use defense, a potential legal shield for those charged with 
violating the basic ban, is one of heart-wrenching defeat: 
For reasons not clear to us, and despite the WIPO Treaty language ‘‘recognizing the need 
to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, 
particularly education, research and access to information [...]’’ our proposal was met 
with strenuous objection. It continued to be criticized even after it had been redrafted, and 
extensively tailored, in response to the myriad of piracy concerns that were raised.135 
The rulemaking proceeding, a “compromise amendment” by Klug, offers no such “applicability 
of traditional copyright limitations and defenses” to charges of circumvention.136 Unable to 
secure such an amendment, a hope embodied in H.R. 3048, Klug and Boucher settle for 
“[d]elegating authority to develop anti-circumvention regulations to the Secretary of Commerce 
[as] a means to eliminate the stalemate that existed.”137 The idea for delegating rulemaking 
authority to the Secretary fits what Hazlett and Spitzer identify as the theory of “[d]elegation as 
part of solving the collective action problem in Congress.”138 Delegating this power to the 
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133 Id. at 85.
134 Id. at 85.
135 Id. at 86.
136 Id. at 86.
137 Id. at 86.
138 Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 136.
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Secretary is palatable to the larger committee because it still effectuates a decrease in the power 
of the courts—shifting venues from a fairly hostile locale to a fairly friendly one. 
 Yet the bill’s House supporters likely had the votes necessary to pass the bill without the 
Klug amendment; this implies that they saw something in the amendment worth allowing. 
Boucher’s vocal opposition to the bill certainly gave them pause, and the amendment gave them 
an out. We believe that one explanation is the most plausible: this delegation of authority is 
perfect to effectuate credit claiming and blame shirking. So long as the rulemaking is only a 
minor threat to the interests of the copyright industries, those industries’ lobbyists will be 
grateful to have shifted questions of fair use away from the federal courts and will (quietly) thank 
Congress for the venue shift. Yet the Commerce Report already begins the process of blame 
shirking: the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress are entrusted with protecting 
the right to make noninfringing uses, so Congress has a scapegoat when critics come 
knocking.139 
3. Conference Version
Thanks to the joint House-Senate conference committee, the final legislation implements 
the amendments of both chambers, with minor changes, and adds a few of its own. Taking their 
cue from one or both chambers, the conference report includes exemptions from one, two, or all 
three bans for nonprofit libraries,140 reverse engineering,141 encryption research,142 and protecting 
personally identifying research.143 It adds an exemption from the access trafficking ban for 
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139 While we support the work done by Hartzog, supra note 19, his article falls into this trap. By 
criticizing the rulemaking absent a theory of delegation, Hartzog fails to lay adequate blame at 
the feet of Congress.
140 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 7 (1998) (§1201(d)).
141 Id. at 8 (§1201(f)).
142 Id. at 8-10 (§1201(g)).
143 Id. at 10-11 (§1201(i)).
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devises with the sole purpose of preventing “the access of minors to material on the Internet.”144 
The conference version exempts one from the basic ban and the access trafficking ban in order to 
engage in security testing of one’s own computer.145 The last new section mandates that VCRs 
and similar devices recognize and obey the copy-preventing technologies for which TPM-vendor 
Macrovision holds the patents; the conferees did so on Macrovision’s promise to charge 
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing fees.146 
The only amendment that the conference version substantively changes is the Klug 
amendment legislating a regular rulemaking proceeding. Rather than entrusting the Secretary of 
Commerce, the conferees delegate this new power to the Librarian of Congress, who shall issue 
any exemptions “upon the recommendations of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult 
with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of 
Commerce.”147 The conference version also changes the rulemaking’s frequency from biennial to 
triennial. Otherwise, the conference version implements the rulemaking in virtually the same 
language. The rulemaking is to consider the same five factors. Likewise, the statute still militates 
against judicial post hoc pardons by defining the triennial proceedings as the only legitimate 
route to exemptions.148 
The final conference report devotes very little space—less than one full sentence—to 
explaining its change in delegation from the Secretary of Commerce to the Register of 
Copyrights. The conferees give this power to the Register, “as is typical with other rulemaking 
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144 Id. at 10 (§1201(h)).
145 Id. at 11 (§1201(j)).
146 Id. at 11-14 (§1201(k)). This amendment, a rider added during conference committee 
markup, is obviously a financial windfall for Macrovision with significant implications for users 
and developers of VCRs.
147 Id. at 5 (§1201(a)(1)(C)).
148 Nimmer, supra note 6, at 698, n.129. 
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under title 17, and in recognition of the expertise of the Copyright Office.”149 The official 
reasons for choosing this particular agent are precedent and expertise—both valid reasons for 
choosing the Register over the Secretary of Commerce. 
While delegation to a seasoned expert is a legitimate claim, theories further down on 
Hazlett and Spitzer’s list provide a more exhaustive explanation for the motivation behind this 
second shift of venue. If the Commerce delegation is a barely clothed move of rent extraction, 
then the Judiciary committees, which both have supervisory authority over the Register and 
(unlike Commerce) are both at the table in the conference negotiations, may be characterized as a 
rent-grabbing move.150 Further, the Register has become increasingly friendly to copyright 
interests in the years leading up to the legislation for structural reasons151 that will likely persist 
indefinitely. Since the DMCA is constructed to benefit copyright holders rather than the 
public,152 the actors driving the bill forward were likely more comfortable with a venue shift that 
places these questions before the Register because institutional pressures force her to be a 
particularly loyal and predictable agent. The final recommendations in 2000 and 2003 largely 
fulfill this promise.153 Finally, choosing an expert overseer better facilitates blame shirking. A 
delegation to the Secretary of Commerce, who is no expert, simply looks less like an honest 
deference to a capable agent; the Register of Copyrights, however, is an undeniable expert. Few 
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149 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 64 (1998).
150 Litman, supra note 17, at 144 (arguing that the assignment of rulemaking responsibility to 
the “Librarian of Congress in consultation with the Copyright Office and the Commerce 
Department” would preserve both “Commerce and Judiciary Committee jurisdiction and the 
associated generous campaign contributions”).
151 Id. at 74. Litman elaborates:
The Copyright Office has a limited budget, and relies on the goodwill of its regular clients. 
Copyright Office policy staff often come from and return to law firms that regularly represent 
copyright owners. Perhaps most importantly, the Copyright Office relies on the copyright bar to 
protect it from budget cuts and incursions on its turf.
152 Id. at 144-145. “There is no overarching vision of the public interest animating the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. None.”
153 See infra Part IV.C. 
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citizens are adequately invested in copyright policy to criticize the final rulings, and even fewer 
are likely to follow the legislative trail closely enough to impugn specific congresspersons’ 
motivations. Under cover of deferral to expertise, congressional actors can delegate to the 
Register, remove courts from the equation, launder their motivations, and quietly cash in political 
capital with the copyright industries. 
 Since the rulemaking is essentially the same and the substantive total of statutory 
exemptions is barely enlarged, the concerns expressed by Klug and Boucher regarding the 
Commerce version are still applicable to the final version. Mysteriously, both Boucher154 and 
Klug155 change their tune, publicly rising to support the final bill. “Whether as a matter of 
conviction or acknowledgment of political reality, at the end of the day no one remained opposed 
to the entire Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”156 We suspect that their reservations about 
Section 1201 were muted by their enthusiasm for the provisions granting new immunities to 
telecommunications companies in their new role as internet service providers.157 
IV. Analysis of Stakeholder Frames 
 Our preliminary analysis of the primary frames used by the categories of stakeholders we 
have identified is directed toward answering three research questions: 
1) What are the primary rhetorical distinctions between those who support and those 
who oppose the granting of exceptions to the 1201 rules? 
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154 144 Cong. Rec. H7096 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
155 144 Cong. Rec. H10621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug).
156 Nimmer, supra note 6, at 725.
157 During the 1996 election cycle, while copyright holders were substantive contributors to 
both representatives’ campaigns, in both cases—especially for Boucher—telecommunications 
firms outspent them. See OpenSecrets.org, Rick Boucher, Detailed Contributor Breakdown, 1996 
Election Cycle, at http://opensecrets.org/1996os/detail/H2VA09010.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 
2005), and OpenSecrets.org, Scott L. Klug, Contributions by Sector, 1996 Election Cycle, at 
http://opensecrets.org/1996os/detail/H0WI02037.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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2) How do participants frame the legislative intent behind the assignment of 
rulemaking authority to the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress? 
3) How does the Register use the legislative history and participants’ arguments in 
granting or denying exemptions? 
The raw materials for our analysis come from the publicly available records of the 
2000158 and 2003159 hearings, from Notice of Inquiry through final ruling. The Copyright Office 
has posted every document from both proceedings on its website,160 greatly facilitating our 
study. The 2000 hearings featured 235 written comments, 129 reply comments, 31 individual 
testimonials, and 28 written post-hearing replies.161 The 2003 hearings featured 51 comments, 
338 reply comments, 63 individual testimonials, and 25 written replies to 9 post-hearing 
questions.162 Once one adds in 5 Notices of Inquiry in the Federal Register, 22 question-and-
answer sessions, twice-daily opening statements for live hearings by the Register of Copyrights, 
and final recommendations by the Register and/or final rulings from the Librarian of Congress, 
the website offers over 900 documents for analysis. To reduce this to a somewhat more 
manageable load, we excluded the 465 written submissions that were not over 1 page long—a 
length we believe is necessary to begin developing a cohesive or unique argument.163 We loaded 
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158 U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works (2000), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/anticirc.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 2000 
Rulemaking].
159 U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works (2003), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 2003 
Rulemaking].
160 The Office has made citation somewhat difficult by periodically changing URLs; we expect 
this problem to grow during the 2006 rulemaking.
161 2000 Rulemaking, supra note 158.
162 2003 Rulemaking, supra note 159.
163 After coding the longer documents, we returned to a random sample of 50 of the 465 
comments that were excluded for being one page or less in length. Of these 50 documents—all 
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the 466 remaining documents into QSR N6, a content analysis software program. N6 allows 
users to conduct string searches across all documents and to individually code text units by hand. 
We divide our analysis of these proceedings into 3 sections. First, we discuss the 
breakdown of documents according to witness affiliation, which is associated with participation 
in live testimony and with support for exemptions. Second, we discuss the different rhetorical 
choices by those who support and those who oppose exemptions. Third, we examine the final 
recommendations and rulings in detail. 
A. Coding by Witness Affiliation 
 To begin our analysis, we hand coded all 466 documents according to the author’s self-
avowed institutional affiliation. For example, if a witness stated, “I am here representing Time-
Warner,” we coded her as belonging to “media.” Note that those whom we coded as representing 
merely themselves are of two types: those who explicitly denounced any official affiliation (e.g., 
stating that they do not speak for their employer) and those who announced no affiliation. Table 
One shows how commenters and witnesses were divided across eight categories. 
Insert Table One Here 
This table makes clear that a number of different stakeholders were well-represented, 
including: media companies, technology firms, educators, and librarians. The general public was 
well-represented; people with no official affiliation participated heavily. This is not true, 
of which oppose 1201 generally and/or support one or more exemptions with varying clarity—
only 3 discuss legislative intent, and only 11 even mention fair use. The most common theme, 
featured in a majority of the documents (27), is an author’s complaint about various consumer 
experiences with TPM-protected media. Almost all of these (25) and about half of the other 
documents (11) object to the DVD Content Scrambling System (CSS). That is 36 out of 50, or 
72% of the total. 
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however, across all types of participation. The bulk of unaffiliated individuals did not participate 
in live hearings, as evidenced in Table Two. 
Insert Table Two Here 
Literally anybody can submit a written comment or reply comment, and that is reflected 
in the fact that a majority of these documents are by authors claiming no institutional affiliation. 
Note, however, the large disparity in which witness types present live testimony; we believe this 
speaks volumes about the level of access actually enjoyed by different types of witnesses. The 
hearings are formally open to any and all comers,164 but the time and expense of traveling to the 
hearings represents a substantial burden for most people. To demonstrate the increased access 
available to various witness types, we take the number of live testimonials and divide by the total 
of comments, reply comments, and testimonials. By this formula, 52% of documents 
representing the views of librarians (12 of 23 total) are delivered in person, and comparably 
favorable ratios are enjoyed by the nonprofit advocacy groups (48%) and the media industry 
(46%). Education (36%) and technology (27%) enjoy somewhat lower rates, though in the case 
of technology submissions, this is due largely to a relative glut of written submissions (56), not 
to a paucity of live testimonials (21). What is most striking is the very low rate of live 
testimonials for unaffiliated individuals (a mere 4%) and the 100% live testimonial ranking for 
the Joint Reply Commenter, Attorney Steve Metalitz.165 
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164 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies: Extension of Deadline for Reply Comment Period; Notice of 
Public Hearings; and Deadline for Post-Hearing Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 14505 (Mar. 17, 2000), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2000/65fr14505.html.
165 Metalitz twice offered written reply comments on behalf of media companies. See Steven J. 
Metalitz, 2000 Reply Comment (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Metalitz 2000 Reply Comment], at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/reply/112metalitz.pdf, and Steven J. Metalitz & Eric 
J. Schwartz, 2003 Reply Comment (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Metalitz & Schwartz 2003 Reply 
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For the sake of this preliminary analysis, we restricted our investigation to those 
documents discussing legislative intent. Recall that the text of the legislation leaves the rules of 
the proceedings very much up in the air, giving great discretion to the Register of Copyrights; 
this places questions of legislative intent at the very heart of the debate about what these rules 
should be. To locate these arguments, we searched for the following terms, including all 
derivatives: Legislat (including, e.g., legislative, legislature, legislate, legislated, etc.), Congress 
(congressional), Histor (history, historical, historically, etc.), Inten (intend, intended, intention, 
intentionally, etc.), and Mean (meaning, meant). Then we searched for combinations of either 
“legislat” or “congress” within two lines of any of the other three terms and hand coded for false 
hits. 
This “legislative intent” search retrieved 130 documents (28%), of which 20 were 
question and answer sessions, which we have not included for this preliminary study.166 Of the 
remaining 110 documents, witnesses were again far more likely to report an institutional 
affiliation, and institutional affiliation was a reasonable predictor of whether a given witness 
supported or opposed exemptions to the basic ban, as illustrated in Table Three. 
Insert Table Three Here 
As one would expect, media companies were generally opposed to exemptions (that is, in 
favor of a total ban on circumvention) while education, library, and nonprofit groups were 
Comment], at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/023.pdf. His post-hearing commentary 
as a Joint Reply Commenter, representing multiple copyright holders, is simply a cost-saving 
measure.
166 Much of our analysis is based on the coding of entire documents, e.g. coding by witness 
type, and/or whether certain codes are found within a given document. (Due to software 
limitations, this emphasis greatly simplifies our analysis.) The question-and-answer documents, 
however, feature large amounts of text from multiple questioners and witnesses. For simplicity’s 
sake, we therefore elide these more difficult-to-handle documents from consideration.
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uniformly in support of exemptions. Technology, which includes hardware manufacturers, 
software developers, scientific bodies (e.g., the Association for Computing Machinery), 
stakeholders that stand to profit from TPMs  (e.g., Macrovision, Inc.), and those who can profit 
from circumventing TPMs (e.g., Static Control Components), is understandably divided. It is 
unsurprising that these allegiances carry over from the congressional debate.  
B. Claims of “Legislative Intent” by Proponents and Opponents 
 Based on the string search for legislative intent claims, we hand-coded each of the 110 
documents to determine the overall context of these claims. We examined the broader argument 
within which each claim was found and coded the document accordingly. Based on this analysis, 
we found over 60 unique argumentative tropes. We also coded these documents based on 
whether they were in support of an exemption to the general ban on TPM circumvention, in 
opposition, or were mixed (e.g., supporting some exemptions and opposing others) or neutral 
(taking no position). Table 4 summarizes the most common pro-exemption arguments (those that 
appeared in at least four documents) and Table 5 summarizes the most common anti-exemption 
arguments. 
Insert Table Four Here 
Insert Table Five Here 
The cleavage between the two sides could hardly be clearer. Only two documents that either 
supports or opposes features a trope from the other side, and these documents feature just one 
such trope. The only 3 “mixed” documents, supporting some exemptions and opposing others, 
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were the three final rulings documents by the Register and/or the Librarian, and 5 of the 6 
“neutral” documents were documents laying the ground rules such as Notices of Inquiry. In such 
an oppositional forum, we expected a sincere cleavage, but the extent of the gap was surprising.. 
Almost all of the arguments offered by both sides fit neatly into three categories: arguments 
about the public policy goals and outcomes of the statute (e.g., preserve fair use, protect 
copyright holders), arguments about the proper procedure and jurisdiction of the rulemaking, and 
arguments about what constitutes a “class of copyrighted works” as defined in Section 
1201(a)(1)(D). 
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1. Public Policy Goals and Outcomes 
The only tropes made by even a sizable number of those who support exemptions are 
those from the cluster of arguments centering on claims of fair use.167 Of the 60 supporting 
documents, fully 50 claimed that Section 1201 intends to preserve fair use—especially through 
the establishment of the triennial hearings. Appearing in 16 documents, the third most common 
claim is that the intent of other sections of copyright law or of copyright law as a whole is to 
preserve fair use. Contrasting this intent with likely effect, 45 documents feature the claim that, 
without an exemption, Section 1201 will reduce or eliminate the ability of some or all people to 
make fair uses. These claims resemble those of a defendant in an infringement suit—so long as a 
fair use is endangered, they collectively imply, a given circumvention must be found “not guilty” 
in advance and an exemption granted. 
Proponents’ fair use claims also often resemble those of Congressional witnesses urging 
the repeal or rewrite of 1201.  Consider this line from the 2003 comment on behalf of the 
Internet Archive. “The proposed exemption restores the proper balance by enabling lawful 
preservation of what an archive has lawfully obtained.”168 The allusion to the balance between 
protection for authors and protection of the public’s broader interest is just one example of the 
broad-minded policymaking rhetoric with which many pro-exemption witnesses frame their 
discussion of fair use. A similar, albeit less common, trope features the claim that the law’s 
intent was not to eliminate the first sale doctrine, but the effect will be just that without one or 
88
167 In an effort to remain true to the argumentation of witnesses, these categories include a large 
number of claims that are not necessarily tied to fair use in the sense laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
Witnesses often tied pro-exemption arguments to claims of fair use but infrequently made 
explicit reference to the statute, its contents, or the corresponding case law. “Fair use” is often 
used in a broader, almost colloquial sense of (sometimes merely allegedly) non-infringing uses 
generally; our coding matches this fact.
168 Brewster Kahle, Alexander Macgillivray, Lawrence Lessig, & Wendy Seltzer, 2003 
Comment, 6-7 (Dec. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Kahle et al. 2003 Comment], at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/025.pdf.
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more exemptions. These arguments closely resemble the congressional statements that we must 
reject a pay-per-use society.169 
While it is made in just 12 of 60 documents, the fourth most common claim by 
proponents is that the ban on circumventing access controls is effectively becoming a ban on 
circumventing use controls. These proponents object to dual-purpose TPMs being entirely 
subject to section 1201(a)(1) protections. The DVD Content Scrambling System (CSS) is 
particularly likely to be the subject of this claim. Electronic Frontier Foundation witness Robin 
D. Gross offers just one such example: 
CSS is not the type of “access” control technology that Congress intended to protect 
when it enacted the DMCA.  ...  DVDs using CSS do not protect against unauthorized 
access to a work.  Pirated DVDs have no trouble playing in DVD-CCA’s licensed 
players.  Rather, the system’s design and ultimate objective is to prevent unauthorized 
copying – by requiring consumers to use devices which obey design restrictions that 
prevent such copying.170 
Gross and others claim that Congress intended to provide greater protections for access-
controlling TPMs, but copyright holders are using technical and legal strategies to “circumvent 
Congress”171 and provide fuller protection for use-controlling TPMs. This constructs the 
proceedings as a mechanism for clearing up unintended consequences of the law and for better 
effectuating the statute’s policy goals. 
A far smaller proportion of exemption opponents’ rhetoric consists of arguments about 
the public policy goals and outcomes of the statute. Most surprisingly, just 20 of the 41 
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169 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 6, at 710-719 (citing congressional avowals that the bill shall 
not lead to a pay-per-use society).
170 Robin D. Gross, 2000 Post-Hearing Comment, 1 (June 23, 2000), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/post-hearing/gross.pdf.
171 Id. at 3.
Catch 1201, p. 46/88
documents contain the argument that a proposed exemption threatens content production because 
copyright holders will not distribute content digitally without the fullest legal protection. They 
make this claim infrequently even though this was a vital part of the statute’s original policy 
justifications.172 As we discuss below, opponents found other, more efficient means of rebutting 
proposed exemptions. 
Opponents’ second, third, and fourth most common public policy arguments were 
targeted at rebutting proponents’ fair use claims. In 8 documents, opponents insist that fair use 
claims are not relevant for one reason or another—especially based on the claim that an intended 
use is not actually a fair use at all. Consider Steven Marks’ 2003 testimony on behalf of the 
RIAA: 
The proponent's exemption is also misguided in that it is predicated on the assumption 
that users, or consumers, have an unqualified right to access works on any device of their 
choosing. ... There is nothing in the DMCA or the fair use doctrine that's intended to 
ensure access to every work in every format.173 
In addition to this argument that a given proposal fails to capture the policy intent of the DMCA 
and the fair use defense, 6 opponents argue that a supposed negative effect on fair use will not 
occur. In 2000, MPAA witness Bernard Sorkin opens his testimony by accusing proponents of 
wildly exaggerating their claims of fair use erosion. “I appreciate the opportunity of being here to 
testify before you in the hope of convincing you that we are not on the brink of the end of 
88
172 See infra Part III.C.
173 Rulemaking Hearing: Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological 
Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, 209-210 (May 14, 2003) (statement of 
Steven Marks, Sr. V.P., Business and Legal Affairs, Recording Industry Ass’n of Am.), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/hearings/transcript-may14.pdf.
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Western civilization as we know it.”174 Further, in 5 documents, opponents contend that the 
availability of media in unencrypted formats—e.g., VHS cassettes instead of DVDs—obviates 
the need for an exemption; would-be fair users can use these unencrypted alternatives. Except for 
the claim that an exemption would reduce creative output, opponents generally avoid the broader 
public policy debate, and those who engage it do so only to rebut fair use claims made by 
proponents. 
2. Procedural and Jurisdictional Claims 
 Instead of public policy claims, opponents devoted most of their energies to making 
claims about the proper procedure and jurisdiction of the proceedings; where proponents fret 
about outcomes, opponents stress strict adherence to the rules of the venue. Each of the most 
common opposition arguments are claims about burden of proof. Consider the argument that 
proponents face the burden of proof. As we discuss more fully below, this argument is hardly 
necessary as the Register makes it quite clear from the beginning. Nonetheless, in 24 out of 41 
documents, opponents make exactly that claim. In all but one of those documents, opponents 
frame the burden as particularly high or difficult to meet. Language like that used by Adobe 
witness Paul Hughes, “Those who assert that the effective date of the § 1201(a)(1)(A) 
prohibition should be further delayed shoulder an extraordinarily high burden of persuasion,”175 
is fairly common. Ironically, Hughes may not have created this sentence whole cloth for his live 
88
174 Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 122 (May 4, 2000) (statement of Bernard Sorkin, Time Warner, 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am.), at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/hearings/1201-504rev.pdf
175 Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, Paul Hughes, May 19, 2000,  4, 13. Available at : 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/hearings/1201-519.pdf
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testimony; months earlier, Metalitz submitted a written comment containing the same sentence, 
except he used the word “heavy” instead of “high”.176 
Opponents’ use of the imagery of the weary proponent with a mammoth weight on her 
shoulders is common. With minor variation, opponents paint the hearings as a last-ditch failsafe 
mechanism primarily to guard against businesses using TPMs in a way that, on balance, 
obviously and seriously damages the public interests. Consider the 2003 reply comment of AOL 
Time Warner Vice President Shira Perlmutter, in which she states, “The legislative history 
anticipates the granting of exemptions in exceptional circumstances as a failsafe mechanism to 
guard against a diminution in the availability of a particular class of copyrighted works.”177 
Metalitz uses similar language, chiding proponents for failing to paint a similar picture of the 
proceedings. “They do not recognize that any demonstrable adverse impact must be balanced 
against the role of the prohibition in fostering the proliferation of “use facilitating” access control 
measures, that enable licensing and other noninfringing uses of copyrighted materials in the 
digital networked environment.”178 Repeatedly, opponents amass a wealth of burdensome 
standards for exemption proponents. 
 Even more frequent is the claim that exemption proponents fail to meet this burden; fully 
80% (33) of opponents make this claim. This claim is often made is response to specific 
proposals, but it is also made quite often in the totalizing, dismissive fashion of Software & 
Information Industry Association witness Keith Kupferschmid. “In sum, we concluded that none 
of the 10 initial or reply comments submitted, either individually or taken as a whole, provide 
88
176 Metalitz 2000 Reply Comment, supra note 165, at 3. We suspect that, even were his 
submission subject to copyright, Metalitz would overlook this minor infraction.
177 Shira Perlmutter , 2003 Reply Comment, at 8 (Feb. 20, 2003), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/019.pdf (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Pt. 2, at 36).
178 Metalitz 2000 Reply Comment, supra note 165, at 4. 
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sufficient concrete evidence to justify the creation of an exemption to Section 1201(a)(1).”179 
Additionally, this argument is often combined with claims about a high burden of proof. Steven 
Marks’ words are again instructive; he sees “the failure of proof by the proponents and the lack 
of a widely-felt, open and notorious problem that might justify an exemption.”180 This one-two 
punch, composed of setting high standards and blaming proponents for not meeting them, is the 
bread-and-butter of exemption opponents. 
 Opponents also use jurisdictional claims to respond to the broader policy claims by 
proponents. A fair number (17) dismiss specific pro-exemption arguments as being beyond the 
jurisdictional pale of the proceedings. Consider the remarks of Association of American 
Publishers Vice President Allen Adler: 
While it is clear that “fair use” is among the non-infringing uses that are subject to this 
proceeding’s mandate ..., it is also clear that this proceeding’s mandate does not invite the 
Librarian to engage in the frolic of attempting to define what uses constitute “fair use” 
with respect to ebooks.181 
Opponents do not stop at insisting that the proceedings are not a courtroom; they also insist that 
the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress cannot make decisions that resemble or 
undermine Congress’s legislative powers. BSA President Robert W. Holleyman, II argues: 
Many of the comments suggest ... that the rulemaking should change the law itself, and 
provide for a general exception permitting reverse engineering. We respectfully submit to 
88
179 Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 136 (May 2, 2000) (statement of Keith Kupferschmid, Software 
and Information Industry Ass’n), at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/hearings/1201-502rev.pdf.
180 Steven Marks, Post- Hearing Response to Question 6, at 3 (July 28, 2003), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/post-hearing/post22.pdf. While we may have missed it, we 
believe the word “notorious” is not in the legislative history; we are a good deal more confident 
that the standard of notoriety is also not there.
181 Allen Adler, 2003 Reply Comment, 5 (Feb. 20, 2003), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/026.pdf.
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you that making such a change to the law is outside the scope of this rulemaking as 
directed by the Congress.182 
When proponents appear to be unhappy with the rulemaking procedure, with the reach of the 
permanent exemptions, or with other parts of Section 1201, opponents urge them to lobby 
Congress for changes. Testifying on behalf of the DVD Copy Control Association, Bruce 
Turnbull says exactly this. “Congress provided a specific exemption for research purpose [sic]
and did not in that exemption permit the Librarian through this proceeding or otherwise to 
modify or extend that statutory exemption. The requester should properly address their pleas to 
Congress.”183 Rather than engaging the broader policy debate, opponents insist that the 
proceedings are not the proper venue for such considerations. 
 In stark contrast to the high frequency of opponents’ venue-specific arguments, 
proponents rarely made such claims. As perhaps the most noteworthy example, consider the 
argument that the Register must weigh the bill’s harms to noninfringing users against the harm 
that a proposed exemption will do to the class of copyrighted works that are exempted. The 
statute—generally thin on guidance for the rules of the proceedings—explicitly requires this 
calculation.184 As part of their claims about legislative intent, 13 out of 38 opponents (34%) 
explicitly make this point, while just 2 of the 60 proponents do .185 This claim is not problematic 
88
182 Robert W. Holleyman II, 2000 Reply Comment, 2 (March 31, 2000), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/reply/118bsa.pdf
183 Rulemaking Hearing: Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological 
Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, 49 (May 2, 2003) (statement of Bruce 
Turnbull, counsel, DVD Copy Control Ass’n), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/hearings/transcript-may2.pdf.
184 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2004).
185 One of these two documents is by Ernest Miller, a fellow of the Information Society Project 
at Yale Law School. 2003 Comment, at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/021.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005). Miller’s submission thoroughly refutes opponents’ disadvantage 
scenarios, and future exemption advocates would be wise to follow his model. Nonetheless, 
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for proponents—a realistic refutation of copyright holders’ doomsday scenarios of wide scale 
infringement, especially infringement that is uniquely attributed to a new exemption, is an 
important and persuasive argument. 
Proponents are also unlikely to engage in arguments about the burden of proof, even 
though this is a fundamental strategy in an adversarial context.186 Only 7 documents contend that 
the burden of proof should be possible, reasonable, or in any way less than the insurmountable 
hurdle described by opponents. Just 6 insist that they have met their burden of proof.  
3. Class of Works 
 In addition to routinely making claims about the rulemaking’s proper jurisdiction and 
procedures, opponents dismiss a number of proposed exemptions based on arguments about what 
legitimately constitutes “a particular class of copyrighted works.”187 In 16 documents, opponents 
argue that a proposed class of works is too broadly drawn. This criticism is most often deployed 
in response to proposals that are aimed at deligitimizing the entire law—for instance, the 
proposed exemption for “everything” contained in one 2003 submission.188 Reid Elsevier witness 
Christopher Mohr establishes the norm in this regard: “These proposals invite not the 
promulgation of an exception to a statute, but a regulatory repeal of it.”189 
Miller’s proposed exemption, for Ancillary audiovisual works distributed on DVDs using the 
Content Scrambling System (CSS) of access control, was rejected. See infra, Part IV.C.2.
186 See, e.g., MARK CROSSMAN, BURDEN OF PROOF: AN INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTATION 
AND GUIDE TO PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
187 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2004).
188 Allen Cook, 2003 Reply Comment, at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/043.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). Cook’s 1-
page submission is actually an underdeveloped complaint about the statute generally. While 
there are exceptions, his is the norm among the documents we excluded from initial 
consideration due to their brevity. We reference his submission here because Mohr, infra note 
189, specifically addresses it. 
189 Christopher Mohr, 2003 Reply Comment, 10, at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/022.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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An additional 9 documents dismissed a proposed class as being based on the traits of 
users and/or the intended uses of copyrighted materials. Instead, these opponents insist, the 
proceedings should serve only to determine a class of copyrighted works as defined in terms of 
the traits of the works themselves. Consider this example by Metalitz: 
Seventh, many submissions fail to properly distinguish between “particular classes” of 
works” and particular (or general) categories of users. The former classification is the 
focus of this proceeding; the latter is not. … The distinction has a practical impact in this 
proceeding. Assertions that the prohibition should not go into effect with respect to 
libraries, with respect to archives, or with respect to any other identified category of 
users, answer a question that Congress has not asked.190 
As with jurisdictional and procedural claims, proponents are also fairly unlikely to engage the 
definitional debate about the proper shape of a class of works. Their claims on this point do, 
however, represent an interesting contest over the purpose of the rulemaking. In their most 
common claim on this point, just 11 proponents urge an exemption based on the intended use 
and/or characteristics of the would-be user. In 10 documents, proponents argue that the statute 
authorizes the granting of exemptions on such grounds. John C. Vaughn, Vice President of the 
Association of American Universities, makes this point very explicitly: 
In short, section 1201 requires the Office to undertake this rulemaking in the context of 
particular users of particular classes of copyrighted works.  The Act gives the Office the 
authority to define an exemption in terms of users as well as classes of works.  Indeed, it 
88
190 Metalitz 2000 Reply Comment, supra note 165, at 10.
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would be contrary to law not to define the exemption in terms of users as well as classes 
of works.191 
On this point, at least, more than a few proponents and opponents assumed that they had finally 
found a legal point of direct contention. As we shall see later, however, the Register of 
Copyrights and Librarian of Congress believe there is no debate to be had on this point. 
C.  Final Recommendations and Rulings 
 Perhaps even more remarkable than this stark division between exemption proponents 
and opponents is the palpable sense that the language of the final rulings more closely resembles 
the anti-exemption side of the debate. In 2000192 and 2003,193 the Register and the Librarian of 
Congress published jointly issued rulings in the Federal Register in which Peters constructs most 
of the document and James H. Billington, the Librarian, merely cements the exemptions. 
Additionally, a much longer letter from Peters to Billington explains her recommendations 
following the 2003 rulemaking.194 The documents each feature sections providing background, 
explaining the purpose and rules for the rulemaking, responding to feedback from the Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce, accepting or denying specific proposed exemptions, and making overall 
observations; in total, they contain 99 such sections. In the list of arguments from the final 
rulings ranked according to frequency, illustrated in Table 6, anti-exemption arguments clearly 
dominate. 
88
191 John C. Vaughn, 2000 Post-Hearing Comment, at 7 (June 23, 2000), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/post-hearing/vaughn.pdf.
192 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies: Final Rule,  65 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Oct. 27, 2000) 
[hereinafter 2000 Ruling], available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2000/65fr64555.pdf.
193 Copyright Office: Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies: Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 Ruling], available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2003/68fr2011.pdf.
194 Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian of 
Congress (Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Recommendations], at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf.
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Insert Table Six Here 
In discussing the Register’s rhetorical patterns, we first discuss the most common 
argument—that proponents fail to meet their burden of proof—as illustrated in one case where 
that is Peters’ sole justification for rejecting a proposal. Next, we consider how this argument fits 
into a more complicated rejection featuring several other arguments. Third, we examine Peters’ 
dismissal of certain proposals because they do not properly define a “class of works” to be 
exempted. Fourth, we consider how this and other justifications are used in sending many 
proponents to seek remedies in other venues. Fifth, we identify some of the major characteristics 
of her support for exemptions. Finally, we use one of the four exemptions granted in 2003 to 
further illustrate some of the central arguments that Peters uses to justify exemptions. 
1. Failed Burden of Proof 
 As with opponents’ documents, the final rulings are filled with jurisdictional and 
procedural dismissals of proposed exemptions; these constitute the top three claims as 
aggregated across the final rulings documents. In easily the most common claim—featured in 57 
sections spread across the three documents—the Register repeatedly concludes that exemption 
proponents have failed to meet their burden of proof. In addition to noting its frequency, this 
argument is worth examining in some detail because it speaks to the Register’s underlying intent. 
Peters summarizes one proposal as “[v]ideo games stored on DVDs that are not available in 
Region 1 DVD format.”195 The petitioner articulates problems in accessing domestically 
unavailable Playstation 2 games with foreign region codings.196 He also explains the act of 
88
195 Id. at 124.
196 Ken Arromdee, 2003 Comment, 5-6, at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/015.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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circumvention that would enable him to access these games.197 In less than a page, Peters 
dismisses the proposal as needing “more and better evidence in order to sustain the proposed 
exemption.”198 She does so by reference to the 2000 rulemaking, in which she contends that the 
“few comments that mentioned this issue do not rise to the level of substantial adverse affect 
[sic] that would warrant an exemption for video games.”199 Yet the statute does not require the 
demonstration that one has been substantially affected. 
 The final statute demands that the rulemaking exempt from the basic ban persons who are 
“adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses”200 
of copyrighted works that are wrapped in access-controlling TPMs. The statute does not mandate 
that adversely affected users carry the burden of proof, and it certainly does not propose a 
measurable standard for the assessment of that burden. Yet Peters, in issuing the 1999 notice of 
inquiry, argues the following: 
It is clear from the legislative history that a determination to exempt a class of works 
from the prohibition on circumvention must be based on a determination that the 
prohibition has a substantial adverse effect on noninfringing use of that particular class of 
works. The Commerce Committee noted that the rulemaking proceeding is to focus on 
“distinct, verifiable, and measurable impacts, and should not be based upon de minimis 
88
197 Id. at 6. While we sympathize with this gaming enthusiast’s plight, this is a less-than-ideal 
proposal for an exemption and our contention is not that a fair interpretation of the statute would 
necessarily lead to an exemption based on this comment alone. Rather, this is one of the few 
rejected exemptions in which Peters relies solely on the argument that the proponent has failed 
his burden of proof. This proposed exemption is therefore ideal for illustrating the “failed 
burden” argument in action without also explaining its use in the context of other arguments.
198 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 124.
199 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,570.
200 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2004).
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impacts.” ... Similarly, the Manager’s Report ... suggested that “mere inconveniences, or 
individual cases ... do not rise to the level of a substantial adverse impact.”201 
These citations do not tell the entire story of the act’s legislative history, and they appear to 
create a burden of proof that is higher than that required by either the statute or a full reading of 
the legislative history. 
As discussed above, the Commerce Report continues to discuss the hearing, implying that 
the burden of proof is fairly reasonable. “Only in categories as to which the Secretary finds that 
adverse impacts have occurred, or that such impacts are likely to occur within the next two years, 
should he or she waive the applicability of the regulations for the next two years.”202 This 
implies that the burden of proof is merely one of demonstrating some measurable adverse effect; 
the word “substantial” is simply not present. 
 Peters does not discuss this part of the report, even though it is on the very next page 
after the section she cites.203 Peters also does not quote the part of the committee report that 
demands that the person running the rulemaking “consult closely” with other consultative 
officials such as the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA),204 who also concludes that the standard of substantial adverse effect is 
88
201 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies: Notice of Inquiry, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,139, 66,141 (Nov. 24, 1999) (citations 
omitted) [hereinafter 1999 NOI], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/1999/64fr66139.pdf.
202 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Pt. 2, at 38. The Register does quote the first half of this sentence in 
the 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,560, yet she cites it only to buttress her requirement that a 
class of works be a subset of a section 102(a) category. The full implication of this entire 
sentence, that the demonstration of adverse impact—no qualifier necessary—on noninfringing 
users of a particular class should generally lead to an exemption, is simply not discussed.
203 Id. at 37.
204 Id. at 37.
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not present in the legislative history.205 Here, although Peters does consult repeatedly with the 
Assistant Secretary and report the NTIA’s objections as required by the statute, 206 she rejects the 
Assistant Secretary’s objections and insists that the standard of substantiality should stay. She 
bases her reasoning on the above-cited interpretation of the Commerce report and on the House 
Manager’s Report. 
 Peters’ heavy reliance on the House Manager’s Report,207 written by the House Judiciary 
Committee after the bill was passed by the full House, foreshadows her eagerness to construct a 
relatively high burden of proof for proponents. The Judiciary Committee, as authors of the 
report, wanted a stricter ban than the one that resulted from Conference Committee and was 
passed by the full House and Senate, so it is hardly surprising that the Committee’s interpretation 
of the statute would construct the rulemaking as heavily stacked against any exemptions. Yet this 
report should not be treated as part of the legislative history of the Act. In addition to its post hoc 
construction, the Library of Congress’s own website for tracking legislative histories makes no
mention of the report.208 
The Register relied upon a dubious representation of legislative intent. Indeed, in the 
2000 final ruling, she acknowledges that some have objected to reliance on the House Manager’s 
Report. She suggests only that: 
88
205 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,562. While a categorical claim of this sort is virtually 
impossible to substantiate, we believe that few if any other recent, visible public debates about 
legislative intent have seriously considered—let alone turned on—a House manager’s report.
206 Id. at 64,561.
207 Staff of House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Section-by-Section Analysis of 
H.R. 2281 as Passed by the United States House of Representatives on August 4, 1998 
[hereinafter House Manager’s Report], available at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/SECTION-BY-
SECTION%20ANALYSIS.pdf.
208 Library of Congress, Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (searched for H.R. 2281 in the 105th Congress; chose “Bill Summary and 
Status File”; chose “All Information (except text)”; found no mention of House Manager’s 
Report, supra note 207) (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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because that report is consistent with the Commerce Committee Report, there is no need 
in this rulemaking to determine whether the Manager’s Report is entitled to less weight 
than the Commerce Committee’s Report. Some critics of the Manager’s Report have 
objected to its statement that the focus of this proceeding should be on whether there is a 
“substantial adverse impact” on noninfringing uses. However, they have failed to explain 
how this statement is anything other than another way of saying what the Commerce 
Committee said when it said the determination should be based on “distinct, verifiable, 
and measurable impacts, and should not be based upon de minimis impacts.”209 
Peters transposes the notion of substantiality from one context (level of proof) to another (level 
of impact) in order to create the illusion that proponents must prove a substantial adverse impact. 
The Commerce Committee report can reasonably be read to require substantial proof—distinct, 
verifiable, and measurable impacts. But the category of “adverse impacts that are not de 
minimis” is hardly coextensive with the category of “substantial adverse impacts.” 
Individual cases are perhaps the best illustration of this difference. Imagine that just one 
citizen demonstrates her inability to access, in any way and in an otherwise legal manner, one 
type of TPM-protected media. Imagine further that she demonstrates that this inability is 
verifiably perpetuated by the legal prohibition on circumventing access control technologies. Her 
inability to access a given media artifact is no mere de minimis impact, yet the House Manager’s 
Report insists, “individual cases ... do not rise to the level of a substantial adverse impact.”210 
88
209 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,558, note 4.
210 House Manager’s Report, supra note 207, at 6.
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In her 1999 NOI, Peters cites this phrase as illustrative of the burden of proof.211 Peters 
relies upon the Commerce directive to demand substantial proof as evidence that the Commerce 
Committee established a requirement for significant impacts on a substantial number of people. 
The same discussion ensues between NTIA and the Register in 2003. Assistant Secretary 
Nancy J. Victory argues, “the standard set forth in the Notice of Inquiry (the "NOI") imposes a 
significantly heightened burden on proponents of an exemption, and is therefore inconsistent 
with the opportunity that Congress intended to afford the user community.”212 In response, the 
Register insists: 
Because it appears that the Assistant Secretary (among others) has in some respects 
misapprehended what was said in the NOI, it is pertinent to offer some additional 
clarification. It appears that the use of the term “substantial” in the NOI and in the 
Register’s recommendation in 2000 has caused undue alarm. ... The phrase “substantial 
adverse impact,” as quoted from the House Manager’s Report in the previous 
recommendation and the NOI, has been mischaracterized by many commenters, 
including both proponents and opponents of exemptions, as requiring a high standard of 
proof.213 
Rather than imposing a heightened burden of proof, Peters insists, she uses the standard of 
substantiality as a means of clarifying and summarizing what she characterizes as agreement 
between the Commerce report and the House Manager’s Report regarding the level of proof. 
This may be somewhat reassuring to proponents, and we must admit that such a claim would be 
88
211 1999 NOI, supra note 201, at 66,141.
212 Nancy J. Victory, Asst. Sec. of Comm. for Communications and Information and 
Administrator of National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Letter to 
Marybeth Peters, ¶8 (August 11, 2003), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/occ/dmca/dmca2003/dmcaletter_08112003.html.
213 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 16.
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inconceivable if Bruce Lehman were in charge of the rulemaking. Yet in later parts of the same 
recommendations, she demonstrates that the standard of substantiality, as defined by the House 
Manager’s Report, does indeed matter.214 
In the case of the proposed exemption for video games that are only available on non-
Region 1 DVDs, Peters identifies the proponent’s failure to meet his burden of proof and she 
dismisses the weight of a single person’s case as inadequate. Even if the commenter had 
documented more personal cases in more adequate detail—even if he had done enough to 
reasonably demonstrate to her satisfaction that an access-controlling TPM was preventing him 
from making lawful uses of lawfully acquired media—she almost certainly still would have 
dismissed his case as just one individual example. 
2. “Failed Burden” within a Larger Argument 
 Having established the burden of demonstrating substantial adverse effect, she dismisses 
the vast majority of proposed exemptions as failing on at least this count. She uses this tool even 
when a substantial record demonstrates a reduced ability to make noninfringing uses, though in 
these cases she combines this argument with others. Consider her 2003 rejection of the carefully 
reasoned proposal to exempt “[a]ncillary audiovisual works distributed on DVDs encrypted by 
CSS.”215 Peters grants that such ancillary materials, such as out-takes, are often unavailable on 
unencrypted media such as VHS216 and that “the desired use for comment and criticism by 
weblog critics can be within the fair use exception.”217 But, she insists, there are alternative, 
88
214 We believe that the best demonstration of this standard’s use to deny an exemption that is 
indeed based in substantially demonstrable adverse impacts is in the 2003 denial of the proposal 
to exempt ancillary audiovisual works distributed on DVDs encrypted by CSS, discussed infra
Part IV.C.2.
215 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 115 (writing primarily in response to Miller, 
supra note 185).
216 Id. at 115.
217 Id. at 116.
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analog solutions. These analog solutions include circumventing the Macrovision copy control on 
the analog output of one’s DVD player and videotaping one’s television screen. The difference 
between analog-quality and digital-quality reproduction matters to many videophiles, she 
acknowledges, but she dismisses this difference as insubstantial. “[W]ithout specific information 
about why this digital content is necessary for the purpose, without information about what type 
of audiovisual or ancillary work is needed for this purpose, and without specific information 
about the purpose and character of the use, it is impossible to assess the merits of the proposal.218 
She apparently believes that quality of reproduction is the primary—perhaps the only—reason to 
prefer digital-to-digital reproduction. She ignores much of the sophisticated legal reasoning 
offered by the proposal’s main advocate, Ernest Miller, a fellow of the Information Society 
Project at Yale Law School. As Miller elaborates: 
In order to publish such multimedia reviews on the Internet, all that is required is a 
computer with a DVD drive and an Internet connection, much like this author’s laptop.  
However, a determination that alternate means to quote the work exist would create 
additional barriers.  For example, rather than simply use the laptop, the author of this 
comment would have to invest in an external DVD player and external television tuner 
that could convert that analog television signal into an appropriate format that the laptop 
could understand.  Possible, yes, but expensive and a barrier to the author’s free exercise 
of First Amendment rights.219 
For Peters to casually dismiss Miller’s argument as failing to meet the burden of proving 
substantial adverse effect, without addressing his claim that unnecessary expenses constitute a 
88
218 Id. at 118.
219 Miller, supra note 185, at 13. 
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barrier to exercising one’s First Amendment rights, is an oversight at best. Yet Peters insists that 
Miller has failed to meet his burden of proving substantial adverse impact.220 
Peters also presents an unrealistically negative vision of the potential decline in content 
production that would result from an exemption. Miller insists that, just as the Register can only 
consider adverse effects on noninfringing users that are directly attributable to the basic ban, she 
can also only consider the negative effects on content production that are directly attributable to 
a proposed exemption from the basic ban. Because she is unable to make a ruling affecting either 
trafficking ban, “any harms that flow from the existence of circumvention devices cannot be 
considered.”221 Despite this obvious statutory mandate, Miller claims, the Register’s 2000 
dismissal of the proposal to exempt audiovisual works on DVDs is defended in part based on the 
prior existence of DeCSS, a hack for defeating CSS.222 Arguably, it is well beyond her statutory 
mandate, which permits her only to examine the negative impacts of exemptions to the basic 
ban.223 It also appears to be in disregard of the rulemaking’s inability to provide “a defense in 
any action to enforce any provision of this title other than this paragraph,”224 despite Peters’ 
explicit reference to this inability at a later point in her 2003 recommendations.225 
Miller uses this demand that the rulemaking set aside all concerns resulting from the 
trafficking in circumvention devices—as well as from infringing circumventions, which would 
also not be protected—to build a strong case that his proposed exemption will have virtually no 
negative impact on the value of copyrighted works: 
88
220 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 119.
221 Miller, supra note 185, at 18.
222 Id. at 18 (citing 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,570).
223 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iv) (concluding that the rulemaking must consider, as one of five 
factors, “the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of 
copyrighted works”).
224 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (2004).
225 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 196.
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The exemption will only apply to noninfringing uses of the ancillary materials on 
lawfully acquired DVDs.  If an individual infringes on the copyright of the ancillary 
materials, the exemption does not apply.  If the individual trafficks [sic] in a 
circumvention device, the exemption will not apply to that act.  For the motion picture 
studios to prevail in this rulemaking, they will have to make a showing as to why the act 
of circumventing access control devices for noninfringing uses of physical media, 
lawfully acquired, is harmful to the value of or market for their works.  This they cannot 
do.226 
This demand for hard proof of measurable negative impacts from the proposed circumvention is 
simply never met. Quite the contrary, the movie industry’s response pretends that the value of 
CSS generally stands as a counterargument to granting the proposed, narrow exemption. Their 
reply comment proudly cites the Register’s 2000 conclusion “that ‘the availability of access 
control measures has resulted in greater availability of these materials,’ and this remains the case 
today. Indeed, many of these [ancillary] works would never have been created but for the 
prospect that they would be distributed on a DVD protected by CSS.”227 This argument that CSS 
is important in general is not necessarily a reason to dismiss a narrowly defined exemption from 
the basic ban. In opposing this exemption, Peters perpetuates the artificial connection between 
Miller’s narrow proposal and broader threats of piracy.228 
While this is just one proposal, it demonstrates Peters’ willingness to deploy a 
combination of her most common anti-exemption arguments to refute a solid proposal. Even if 
there is a noninfringing use at stake, any alternative solutions—even if suboptimal and 
88
226 Miller, supra note 185, at 19.
227 Metalitz & Schwartz, 2003 Reply Comment supra note 165, at 36.
228 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 118. (concluding, “Given the risks of 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution over the Internet, it is obvious that a compelling case 
would have to be made in order to outweigh the potential adverse effects.”).
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unnecessarily expensive—severely reduce the need for an exemption (Peters’ 4th most common 
argument; see Table 6). Any proposed benefit to noninfringing users must be weighed against 
the potentially diminished creative output (3rd), and this threat is taken to be real (5th) despite 
flimsy links to a given proposal. Because the pro-exemption side faces the burden of proof (8th), 
and they fail to meet this burden (1st) in demonstrating substantial harm, she reasons, the 
exemption is denied. 
3. Improperly Defined Class of Works 
 The register also dismisses a number of proposals for improperly defining a class of 
works to be exempted. In two familiar arguments, she declares that many proposed classes are 
either two broad or are wrongly defined in terms of types of users or their intended uses. As the 
statute mandates: 
The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to persons who are users of 
a copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if such persons are, or are 
likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by virtue of such 
prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works 
under this title, as determined under subparagraph (C).229 
The definition of the phrase “particular class of works” is hotly contested. The register’s 1999 
notice of inquiry relies upon the House Manager’s Report, concluding “that the scope of ‘class of 
works’ is narrower than the category of works set forth in 17 U.S.C. 102(a).”230 Within the 
assumption that a class of works should be a subset of the categories of works that are available 
for copyright protection, the Register’s reasoning is relatively sound. A few of these categories 
are: literary works, musical compositions, motion pictures, and sound recordings. The Register 
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uses the category of literary works to illustrate the potentially broad-ranging reach of an 
exemption class that is coextensive with one of the eight categories. Within it, “one finds prose 
journals, periodicals, and books as well as computer programs, and ... it is unlikely that the 
impact on [sic] prohibiting circumvention of access control technologies will be the same for 
scientific journals as it is for computer operating systems.”231 Yet the statute does not mandate 
that particular classes of works be defined purely in terms of the traits of the works themselves. 
As noted above, some participants in the rulemaking contend vociferously that the traits of the 
intended users are a valid and important part of any workable definition of a class of works. 
 Participants are not the only voices arguing for classes of works based upon the traits of 
users or their intended uses. Gregory L. Rohde, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Communications and Information and Administrator of the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), also uses his consultative role to make the same push. In 
light of the 1999 NOI, Rohde’s 2000 consultative letter specifically challenges the Register’s 
interpretation and insists, “the definition of classes of works is not bounded by limitations 
imposed by Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, but incorporates an examination of the 
‘noninfringing uses’ of the copyrighted materials.”232 In addition to pleading for a general 
reframing of the requirements for such classes, Rohde supports the class proposed by the library 
communities,233 which would exempt “[w]orks embodied in copies that have been lawfully 
acquired by users or their institutions who subsequently seek to make noninfringing use 
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thereof.”234 This would exempt a large number of works from across a host of section 102(a) 
categories of works, a much broader interpretation of the power of the exemption hearings than 
that defended by the Register. Note that Rohde makes this argument of administrative authority 
through heavy appeal to the Commerce Report and to that committee’s role in having added the 
rulemaking to the statute.235 As one would expect, the Register notes this alternate reading of the 
statute, strongly disagrees, and insists that a class of works must be defined in terms of the 
attributes of the works themselves.236 
In 2003, Assistant Secretary Nancy J. Victory also urges Peters to create classes of works 
based in part on the attributes of uses or users, but this plea diverges less from Peters’ 
definitional requirements than does Rohde’s letter. Victory agrees that proponents must choose a 
section 102 category as the starting point for defining a particular class of works. Nonetheless, 
she argues: 
[I]n some circumstances, the intended use of the work or the attributes of the user are 
critical to a determination whether to allow circumvention of a technological access 
control. Section 1201(a)(1) is, however, silent regarding the manner in which and by 
what criteria "class of works" may be further defined.237 
While acknowledging this request, Peters provides no direct response to it.238 Rather, she simply 
dismisses the possibility that works could be exempted based on the type of user or use.239 
This additional burden in hand, she dismisses 11 of 35 proposed exemptions for failing to 
properly define a class of works. In her 2000 denial of the proposed exemption for “material that 
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cannot be archived or preserved,” the comment that this fails to constitute an acceptable class of 
works is just the brief beginning to a multi-pointed rejection. 240 The same is true of her rejection 
of “works embodied in copies which have been lawfully acquired by users who subsequently 
seek to make non-infringing uses thereof.”241 In these and several other instances, she briefly 
comments that there is no acceptable class of works, and she then spends far more time 
identifying the failure to demonstrate harms that are due to TPMs. In some cases, however—e.g., 
her 2003 dismissal of proposals for “all works”242 and “fair use works”243—she relies almost 
exclusively on this reasoning. As part of the latter denial, she refers would-be proponents 
elsewhere. “It is also of note that several bills currently before Congress incorporate use-based 
revisions of section 1201. If Congress finds that an expansion to [sic] the existing statutory 
exemptions is warranted, it will accomplish that through legislation.”244 In this place as well as 
many others, the overseer of the congressional “solution” throws her hands up at her inability to 
solve the problem and refers the proponents back to Congress. 
4. Cited Pro-Exemption Arguments Are Irrelevant in this Venue. 
 In the second-most-common argument, the Register regularly insists that exemption 
proponents have missed the point of the proceeding. She uses this reasoning in rebutting the 
NTIA’s 2000 support for the library associations’ proposal245 and in sternly lecturing proponents 
en masse in the 2000 final ruling. She also uses this reasoning in at least part of her justification 
for almost two thirds of denied exemptions (22 of 35). Most remarkably, she insists that 
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proponents of two different granted exemptions have also provided arguments that exceed the 
mandate of the rulemaking. We discuss each of these in turn. 
 First, consider her insistence that the NTIA’s support for the library associations’ 
proposal to exempt lawfully acquired works for noninfringing uses misses the point of the 
hearings. She believes this approach “would, in effect, revive a version of section 1201(a)(1) 
focusing on persons who have gained initial lawful access that was initially enacted by the House 
of Representatives but ultimately rejected by Congress.”246 For this and other reasons, the 
exemption “is beyond the scope of the Librarian’s authority.”247 Peters does not here dismiss the 
librarians’ proposal248 as a bad policy decision, but rather takes umbrage at her ability to 
implement in light of her legislative authority. She even offers a ray of hope for its advocates: 
Some of the issues raised by the Assistant Secretary are also likely to be addressed in a 
joint study by the Assistant Secretary and the Register pursuant to section 104 of the 
DMCA. See 65 FR 35673 (June 5, 2000). It is possible that this study will result in 
legislative recommendations that might more appropriately resolve the issues raised by 
the Assistant Secretary. 
While the Register expresses some sympathy, she believes she does not have the power to 
implement the proposed exemption. This claim is based largely on the belief that the proposal 
fails to properly define a class of works. If proponents are concerned about a broader problem 
that cuts across many classes of works, she implies, they should talk to Congress. 
 Second, the Register rejects a solid majority of proposed exemptions as, at least in part, 
missing the point of the rulemaking. In her 2003 recommendations, she creates the final category 
of denied exemptions around this theme. “A number of comments discussed issues unrelated to 
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the anticircumvention provision that is the focus of this rulemaking.”249 Into this category she 
groups proposals that oppose section 1201 or the DMCA generally, oppose unrelated sections of 
the DMCA, or oppose the antitrafficking provisions. These proposed exemptions are clearly 
outside the rulemaking authority granted by the statute, and the register confidently rejects them 
on these grounds alone. In other cases, however, she combines this reasoning with other 
objections to denied exemptions; this is quite often related to the argument that proponents have 
improperly defined a class of works. For instance, she denies a 2000 proposal for archival 
materials because it is a use-based proposal that cuts across many classes of works, and she 
elaborates that her hands are tied in this situation. “The Office is limited to recommending only 
particular classes”250 of works, she insists.  In 2003, she adopts even stronger language in 
rejecting several classes, “including ‘per se educational fair use works’ and ‘fair use works.’”251 
Peters elaborates: 
A “use-based” or “user-based” classification was rejected by the Register in the last 
rulemaking, because the statutory language and the legislative history did not provide 
support for classification on this basis. Defining a class in such a manner would make it 
applicable to all works and would not provide any distinctions between varying types of 
works or the measures protecting them. If an exemption encompassing all works is to be 
granted, it is more appropriately a matter for Congressional action.252 
This is a fairly common theme; the Register often insists that she has no power to help 
proponents and refers them to Congress for a redress of their grievances. She also refers 
88
249 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 195.
250 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, at 64,572.
251 2003 Recommendations, supra note 194, at 85.
252 Id.
Catch 1201, p. 70/88
proponents to the courts, albeit less frequently.253 While rejecting at least one exemption each 
year, she notes that the problem of dual-purpose TPMs is regrettable but not her jurisdiction. In 
2000, for instance, her rejection of the proposal to exempt DVDs states that Congress would be a 
better venue and implies that even the courts would be more appropriate: 
The merger of technological measures that protect access and copying does not appear to 
have been anticipated by Congress… [N]either the language of section 1201 nor the 
legislative history addresses the possibility of access controls that also restrict use. It is 
unclear how a court might address this issue. It would be helpful if Congress were to 
clarify its intent…254 
In this case and others, Peters implies that she sympathizes with proponents but believes she is 
powerless to help them. 
 Perhaps more remarkably, the Register twice refers to arguments for granted exemptions 
as reaching beyond the scope of the rulemaking. First, in granting an exemption in 2000 for 
“literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access control 
mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage or obsoleteness,”255 the 
Register notes that the reasoning would equally apply to any such works where access is denied 
by failed TPMs: 
Although this exemption fits within the parameters of the term “class of works” as 
described by Congress, it probably reaches the limits of those parameters. … [I]n reality, 
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this exemption addresses a problem that could be experienced by users in accessing all 
classes of copyrighted works. This subject matter is probably more suitable for a 
legislative exemption, and the Register recommends that Congress consider amending 
section 1201 to provide a statutory exemption...256 
The Register sounds a similar note in 2003 while supporting the exemption designed to aid the 
preservation of computer programs and video games that are in obsolete formats: 
In essence, the problem confronting archival activity in the digital age is a “use-based” 
concern that is more appropriate for congressional consideration and properly crafted 
legislative amendment than it is for this rulemaking. … [T]here is a tension created by the 
DMCA that is likely to grow and that should be considered by Congress in a 
comprehensive fashion.  Although the remedy is beyond the scope of this rulemaking 
since it is a problem that relates to all digital works and is a problem that is not resolved 
by three-year exemptions, the potential adverse consequences raise serious concerns.  …  
At present, and due to the limitations of the §1201 rulemaking process, the Register finds 
that the problem established in the record can best be addressed in this rulemaking by 
exempting the recommended class.257 
In both of the above cases, the Register acknowledges some of the innocent casualties of the 
legislation, yet she insists that she is not able to address these broader problems in the 
rulemaking and that Congress is best suited to remedy these problems. Most strikingly, she 
argues that the proponent of the latter exemption258 could have killed its chances had he provided 
enough proof to justify a broader exemption: 
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In principle, these considerations apply to a wide variety of works, but proponents of an 
exemption have provided sufficient facts to justify only the narrower class recommended 
herein. Moreover, to the extent that this factor warrants exempting all works (or all works 
in digital formats) from the prohibition of §1201(a)(1) in order to enable preservation 
activities, it actually would warrant rejection of the exemption… Paradoxically, the 
failure of the proponents of this exemption to justify the need to circumvent access 
controls for all the types of works they proposed to be exempted may have salvaged what 
otherwise would have been an overly broad proposal...259 
To the extent that they exist, the problems of access and archiving caused by the failures of 
TPMs or the evolution of technology reach across several section 102(a) categories of works. As 
with dual-purpose TPMs, the Register acknowledges that there are substantial problems with the 
legislation that reach across multiple categories of 102(a) works and expresses some sympathy 
for those adversely affected by the basic ban. Yet she explicitly interprets her powers as narrowly 
constructed and thus eliminates her own ability to ameliorate the law’s disadvantages. 
5. In Support of Exemptions: Some Trends  
 Thus far, we have highlighted how the Register’s reasoning generally proceeds from the 
same sorts of reasoning proffered by anti-exemption witnesses; her most common claims have 
taken the form of procedural and jurisdictional arguments. Likewise, her support of exemptions 
generally reproduces some of the most common arguments of proponents, and it likewise focuses 
on policy outcomes. Nonetheless, this divide is not as sharp as between proponents and 
opponents. In opposing exemptions, Peters is more likely to engage in the debate over policy 
goals and outcomes. She frequently invokes the statute’s stated goal to preserve the economic 
incentives of copyright, and she works to rebut proponents’ claims of harm by referring them to 
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non-circumventing solutions to their fair use problems. While she is fairly likely to reject classes 
of works as improperly defined, she is actually more likely to use policy outcomes to reject 
arguments. Likewise, in supporting exemptions, Peters is more likely than proponents to make 
procedural claims and class-of-works arguments. Yet, as do proponents generally, Peters places 
policy goals and outcomes most prominently in her support for exemptions. 
 The Register’s most commonly used pro-exemption argument is that the statute intends to 
preserve fair use; this appears in 13 of 99 sections. In all three documents, she makes this claim 
in her introductory explanation of the purpose of the rulemaking. For instance, she quotes from 
the Commerce report where it states, “The primary goal of the rulemaking proceeding is to 
assess whether the prevalence of these technological protections, with respect to particular 
categories of copyrighted materials, is diminishing the ability of individuals to use these works in 
ways that are otherwise lawful.”260 This discussion of the intent of 1201 to preserve fair use is 
primarily presented in preliminary sections of the documents; she only discusses it explicitly in 2 
of the 10 sections recommending exemptions. 
 In another policy argument, the Register’s third most-common pro-exemption claim is 
that, without an exemption, 1201 will erode the ability to make noninfringing uses. She makes 
this claim in all 10 sections recommending an exemption—and nowhere else. For instance, in the 
2000 ruling, she recommends an exemption for “compilations consisting of lists of websites 
blocked by filtering software applications,”261 particularly those that filter allegedly offensive 
content. As part of this recommendation, she argues, “a persuasive case was made that the 
existence of access control measures has had an adverse effect on criticism and comment, and 
most likely news reporting, and that the prohibition on circumvention of access control measures 
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will have an adverse effect.”262 While the two arguments are less closely coupled than in pro-
exemption documents, the Register is here completing their most common syllogism: the statute 
intends to preserve fair use via the rulemaking, and without an exemption, fair use will be 
endangered, so an exemption is warranted. On this count, at least, when the Register supports 
exemptions, she sounds like pro-exemption witnesses. 
 Other common arguments, however, differ sharply from the bulk of pro-exemption 
speakers. Her second most frequently used claim is that a proposed class of works is defined 
properly, and in an argument that is tied for third most-common, she argues that the pro-
exemption side meets its burden of proof. The former, appearing in 11 sections, further 
demonstrates the Register’s tremendous attachment to the requirement for a properly defined 
class of works. Yet in most instances, she does not simply support the class of works as defined 
by proponents. In several cases, she carves out classes of works that are more narrowly tailored 
to the evidence that justifies an exemption.263 
The argument that the pro-exemption side meets its burden of proof, found in 10 sections, 
further illustrates her demand that proponents demonstrate substantial adverse effect; in all six 
approved exemptions, she explicitly states that they have done so. In the case of the 
circumvention to gain access to lists of websites blocked by content-filtering software, she even 
commends the exemption’s proponent, Seth Finkelstein, as providing an example to teach future 
proponents how to meet the burden of proof: 
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The case made by Mr. Finkelstein for this exemption is also instructive for the manner in 
which it met the requisite showing. The evidence produced did not prove that a 
substantial number of people have utilized or were likely to utilize an exemption. [I]t was 
the qualitative need for an exemption that was controlling in this case; absent the ability 
of a few to carry out their noninfringing efforts notwithstanding the prohibition set forth 
in section 1201, the many would not reap the … information, analysis, criticism and 
comment enabled by the quantitatively small number of acts of circumvention.264 
When rejecting or accepting proposals, Peters insists that the burden of proving substantial 
adverse effects is most often one of the determining factors. Unlike proponents, then, Peters 
spends a lot of her pro-exemption energies in instruction to the uninformed, detailing the proper 
outlines of a proposed class of works and demonstrating the procedural claim that proponents 
have met their burden of proof. 
6. An Example of Support: The eBook Exemption 
 While these pro-exemption arguments are relatively straightforward, we believe Peters’ 
2003 reasoning in support of the ebook exemption illustrates them in action in a way that further 
illuminates Peters’ very human role in the hearings. In stark contrast to her rejection of the DVD 
ancillary materials proposal, Peters here acknowledges that the added difficulties of making 
noninfringing uses without circumventing TPMs are substantial adverse impacts. She supports an 
exemption for the following class of works: 
Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the work 
(including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access 
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controls that prevent the enabling of the ebook’s read-aloud function and that prevent the 
enabling of screen readers to render the text into a “specialized format.”265 
In defining “specialized format,” “digital text,” and “authorized entities,” the regulatory text 
refers to the 1997 Chafee Amendment, a statutory exemption that allows organizations devoted 
to serving the needs of the visually impaired to reproduce entire works in audio or Braille 
form.266 While this exemption is available to all noninfringing uses of works in the exempted 
class—here, the Register laments, it is explicitly targeted at aiding those who aid the visually 
impaired and thereby making more works available in specialized format. 
 As we would expect, Peters argues that TPMs prevent the ability to make such 
noninfringing uses—that, without an exemption, the right to make noninfringing uses will be 
eroded. In this case, the visually impaired and those who make copyrighted works available to 
them have less access to written materials. Even though it is a use-restricting feature that is the 
problem, these features are generally protected by access-controlling TPMs and the 
circumvention required to work around these obstacles would otherwise violate the basic ban.267 
The obstacle is arbitrary; publishers can turn text-to-speech functionality on or off when they are 
wrapping ebooks in such dual-purpose TPMs. The Register also insists that 1201 is not intended 
to protect their decision to actively turn off disability-ameliorating features of their products. 
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There is “no reason to believe that Congress intended to give its blessing to such conduct.”268 As 
a definitional matter, the Register commends the proposal by the library associations for defining 
a class of works that “commences with a section 102 category but, drawing on the guidance 
offered in the previous rulemaking, narrows it by reference to attributes of the technological 
measures that control access to the works.”269 In detailed but straightforward prose, then, the 
Register declares that there are noninfringing uses at stake, that the bill is not intended to prohibit 
uses such as these, and that proponents have offered a properly defined class of works. If the 
harm to noninfringing users is greater than the harm to the market value of copyrighted works, 
then, she has set up a fine case for proposing an exemption. 
 The most revealing aspect of this section is Peters’ summary of the debate considering 
whether the harm to noninfringing users is substantial enough to meet their burden of proof. 
Publishers insist that the harm is not due to the inability to access these materials;270 the ebooks 
under consideration have been printed in hardcopy and are therefore accessible to those who 
would make noninfringing uses, e.g. creating audio books for the visually impaired. The register 
acknowledges that alternative means are available, but she finds this argument unpersuasive: 
It has been argued by opponents of the exemption that entities such as Bookshare.org can 
make text versions of all books accessible to the blind and visually impaired since anyone 
can scan a book and submit it to Bookshare.org. However, the fact that any book might 
conceivably be made available does not mean that all books are or will be made available 
through such organizations. Resources are limited…271 
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In other words, when a socially valuable noninfringing use is at stake, the Register can exempt 
certain classes of works merely because it makes such uses easier or cheaper. This is true even 
when the alternative medium of access (in this case, print) is the dominant medium and the 
TPM-laden digital medium is in its infancy. In other words, the Register establishes the 
precedent that the mere existence of alternative means of access does not preclude the finding 
that the basic ban is harming otherwise noninfringing users in a way that justifies an exemption. 
From the perspective of those who support exemptions, the Register does offer one 
problematic claim in her support for this exemption. She argues, “a broad exemption on ebooks 
generally could create significant harm to this emerging market by facilitating Napster-like 
distribution of ebooks over the Internet,”272 and she insists that this is only prevented by the 
extremely narrow parameters of the current exemption. Yet her reasoning on this point is as 
problematic as is that discussed above in relation to the proposed exemption for ancillary 
materials on DVD. In short, Peters fails to demonstrate that widespread infringement will 
uniquely result from an exemption. The statute plainly states that exemptions apply only to 
persons who are making noninfringing uses,273 so copyright holders could pursue illicit ebook 
distributors for 1201 violations regardless of the framing of the exemption. The exemption also 
provides no sanctuary for those who would violate the trafficking bans. Here as in the ancillary 
materials rejection, Peters alleges but fails to demonstrate that widespread circumvention would 
uniquely result from a broad exemption. 
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Note, however, that her support for this exemption takes a profoundly different view of 
the harm to noninfringing users when alternative, albeit less than ideal, means of noninfringing 
use are available than does her rejection of the ancillary materials proposal. In rejecting the 
proposal by Ernest Miller, Peters simply ignores Miller’s claim that the extra trouble and 
expense of acquiring extra equipment constitutes an unacceptable tax on noninfringing users. In 
supporting the ebooks exemption, however, she herself uses exactly this reasoning in rebutting 
the publishers’ argument that there are alternative—in this case, utterly accessible—means of 
making a noninfringing use. This is a demonstrable inconsistency in her threshold for 
determining when proponents have demonstrated substantial adverse effects, because in both 
cases, “mere” inconvenience and added expense are at stake. We suspect that Peters could not 
help but have weighed these cases differently based in part on which noninfringing users (online 
movie critics versus nonprofits devoted to helping the blind) will benefit from the two proposed 
exemptions. Considering her adamant insistence that classes of works be defined without any 
reference to intended uses or types of users, this outcome is more than a little ironic. We could 
also point to at least one other difference that also could have had an unacknowledged effect on 
Peters’ reasoning: DVDs are far more important to the far more lucrative movie business than 
are ebooks to the publishing industry. 
V. On Parting (with Fair Use) 
David Nimmer argues that Section 1201 “seems to be a conscious contraction of user 
rights.”274 Our analysis of the legislative process that led to the law and the process for 
determining exemptions to the basic ban buttresses this critique. Those who oppose exemptions 
triumphantly leverage the rules of the hearings to their advantage. Their regular insistence that a 
given proposed exemption is too broad and is therefore a matter to be taken up by Congress—
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and not the courts—is a clear allusion to the shift of venue; Congress has explicitly washed its 
hands by creating the hearings. Opponents’ mantra that proponents face a high burden of proof 
and a difficult task in defining a “class of works” indicates that they perceive this venue as 
friendly. The arguments of exemption proponents, conversely, reveal flagging efforts to find a 
foothold in a hostile venue. Proponents rarely discuss the rules of the hearings, and those who do 
are more likely to rail against the interpretations of the statute or the statute itself than they are to 
trumpet the rules. The final rulings and recommendations bear a much closer resemblance to the 
rhetoric of opponents than to that of proponents; this is most significant on important points such 
as the strict requirements for a narrowly defined “class of works” and the presumption against 
exemptions. At times, the Register of Copyrights even implies that her hands are tied when it 
comes to helping proponents. This study therefore reveals a pattern in which proponents, 
opponents, and adjudicators all implicitly agree that the new venue places a heavy thumb on one 
side of the scales. 
 The DVD Content Scrambling System is the single most controversial TPM scheme 
considered in the rulemaking; despite hundreds of calls for an exemption and documented harms 
to fair use, it remains unscathed by the final rulings. Regardless of the statute’s insistence on the 
continued availability of defenses such as fair use, it remains illegal to circumvent the access 
controls on a legally purchased DVD, even for purposes such as playing it on one’s home 
machine or using 15 seconds of footage for scholarly commentary. Even if the Librarian of 
Congress were to rule that circumventing CSS to access DVDs for otherwise noninfringing 
purposes is legal, this would help only the few who have the technical skill to make such a 
circumvention themselves; the Librarian has no power to permit the development and circulation 
of circumvention tools. 
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This is a significant shift of venue, taking the responsibility for ensuring fair use away 
from the courts and giving it to an obscure, relatively toothless administrative hearing. For 
decades, federal courts have predictably sided with those who have made noninfringing uses and 
substantially noninfringing technologies. Now, those legal principles are generally unavailable to 
defendants who are accused of violating Section 1201. This leaves wider fair use concerns 
without a venue. Congress has insisted that the hearings are the proper venue, while the Librarian 
insists that these concerns should be taken to Congress. The courts now serve only to determine 
whether a defendant has circumvented a TPM or trafficked in the tools to do so, regardless of her 
intentions. This is a catch-22; no matter where a would-be noninfringing user goes, she is told to 
take her concerns elsewhere because the venue at hand is not in charge of these particular 
concerns. In varying degrees, each of these venues has even acknowledged the potential flaws of 
section 1201, but the overseers of each venue protest that they are helpless to restore the proper 
balance among competing rights. 
For those who would circumvent a TPM en route to committing an infringement of 
copyright law, the additional dissuasive power of the basic ban is virtually nonexistent. Yet this 
elephant stands boldly in the rulemaking's living room. Surely the Register and almost 
everybody else involved has noticed its presence. Yet the charade proceeds, and Peters continues 
to pretend that a carefully phrased exemption can provide meaningful relief at minimal cost. Not 
many have really been fooled, and scant few continue to play along. 
This is not to say that the Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters is coldhearted or 
unconcerned. While copyright holders objected vociferously to each, Peters did see fit to 
recommend 6 exemptions. Thanks to the Register, we know more about the software that filters 
content for our children. And, assuming that the two completely new exemptions from 2003 have 
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been used, our society can better archive materials that are in obsolete formats, and visually 
impaired readers have access to more books.  
Despite her commendable support for narrow exemptions, however, the Register's 
reasoning has been deeply flawed on several points. The differences between the House 
Manager's Report and the Commerce Committee Report are meaningful, and the latter is by far 
the more legitimate source for divining legislative intent. More realistically, there is no primary 
intent behind section 1201, but rather a clash of hopes and wishes that tumbled out in the form of 
an awkwardly-worded statute.  
Peters should admit that she has created the rules from congressional scraps. She should 
consider the demonstration of some adverse impact on even one noninfringing user as creating 
the exigency for granting an exemption, subject to the other four statutory factors. She should 
take the statutory reference to users and uses, as well as the tradition of use-based fair use 
jurisprudence, as an imperative to craft exemptions that are less narrowly tied to the traits of 
works and are more targeted at the socially valued uses that she identifies as newly endangered; 
this may be accomplished by granting multiple exemptions across multiple classes of works. 
Perhaps most importantly, she should spend less time piecing together bureaucratic obstacles to 
meaningful relief and spend more time —exploring the possibilities of the rulemaking. 
Unfortunately, if her preemptively defensive 2005 Notice of Inquiry275 is any indicator, the 2006 
exemptions will do little more—and perhaps even less—than the current set to alleviate the 
erosion of fair use.  
More usefully, we think that Congress should scrap the whole artifice as soon as possible. 
In each of the last three Congresses, Rick Boucher has sponsored legislation that would, among 
88
275 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies: Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201), available at: http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr57526.html.
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other things, exempt those engaged in otherwise noninfringing uses from the basic ban.276 We 
are not surprised that Congress has mostly ignored this needed reform. It is because of them that, 
in the digital millennium, fair use is locked in a catch 1201.
88
276 H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002), H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003), H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. 
(2005).
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Table 1: Number of documents by witness type 
 
Witness Type Examples/Description # doc’s % of total 
Self Those who disavow or do not present any 
official affiliation 
172 37% 
Technology firms Consumer electronics, computer hardware, 
business software, e-security products, web 
filtering software, copy-control technology 
88277 19 % 
Media firms Publishing, recorded music, TV, radio, 
webcasters, media industry associations (e.g., 
RIAA) 
62 13 % 
Nonprofit advocacy Groups that advocate on behalf of certain 
sectors of the population (e.g., Amer. 
Foundation for the Blind) or the general public 
(e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation) 
34 7 % 
Government Those who are steering the proceedings (e.g., 
Register of Copyrights), other officials (e.g., 
Idaho State Controller’s Office) 
29 6% 
Library Library associations, official representatives of 
individual libraries, the Internet Archive 
28 6% 
Education Colleges & universities only 25 5% 





Attorney hired by multiple firms to oppose 
exemptions 
11 2% 
TOTAL Number of documents searched 466 100% 
88
277 We coded the testimony of Peter Jaszi, speaking on behalf of the Digital Future Coalition 
(DFC), as both “technology” and “nonprofit.” The DFC is itself a nonprofit advocacy group that 
has attracted educators, librarians, and activists to its cause (therefore resembling, in tenor, goals, 
and structure, groups such as Public Knowledge), but it is also associated with consumer 
electronics manufacturers. Four additional documents are coded as both Technology and Media. 
This caused the misalignment between the total among categories (446) and the total number of 
documents (441), in this and other tables involving witness categories. 
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Self 97 62 7 6 - - 
Tech 18 38 21 11 - - 
Media 5 20 21 16 - - 
Nonprofit 8 7 14 5 - - 
Gov’t 1 2 - - 23 3 
Library 2 9 12 5 - - 
Education 9 5 8 3 - - 
Joint Reply 
Commenter 
- - 6 5 - -
88
278 The general public was allowed to offer post-hearing comments in 2000 only; in contrast, 
post-hearing comments in 2003 represent answers to 9 written questions that were posed only to 
those who gave oral testimony.
279 “Rules” documents set ground rules for the hearings, including Notices of Inquiry in the 
Federal Register, daily opening statements by the Register of Copyrights, and questions 
soliciting post-hearing comments.
280 2000 Ruling, supra note 192, 2003 Ruling, supra note 193, and 2003 Recommendations, 
supra note 194. 
Table 3: “Legislative Intent” Documents by Witness Type 










Support Oppose Mixed Neutral 
Tech 88 32 36% 14 18 - - 
Media 62 27 44% 4 23 - - 
Nonprofit 34 16 47% 16 - - - 
Education 25 11 44% 11 - - - 
Library 28 8 29% 8 - - - 
Gov’t 29 8 28% - - 3 5 
Self 172 8 5% 8 - - - 
JRC 11 4 36% - 3 - 1 
Total 444 110 23% 60 41 3 6 
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Table 4: Frequency of Pro-Exemption Arguments 
 
Argument 
* = Public policy goals/outcomes 
‡ = Jurisdictional/procedural 
















* 1201 intends to preserve fair use 50 - 3 - 53 
* Without an exception, 1201 will shrink fair use 45 - 3 2 50 
* Intent of other copyright law is to preserve fair use 16 - 1 0 17 
*
Ban on circumventing access 
controls will envelop 
circumvention of use controls 
12 - 1 - 13 
> Urges a use-based exemption 11 - - - 11 
> Exemptions can legitimately be based on class of users 10 - - 1 11 
* Effects of 1201 will be to eliminate first-sale doctrine 10 - - - 10 
The statute is unclear 7 - 2 1 10 
‡ The pro-exemption side meets its burden of proof 6 - 3 - 9
* (Attacking an interpretation as shrinking fair use) 8 - - - 8
* Intent was not to eliminate first-sale 8 - - - 8
‡ Burden of proof should be possible/reasonable 7 - - 1 8
* Exemption is not a threat to content production 6 - 1 - 7
> Proposed class of works is defined properly 3 - 3 - 6
88
281 Just three documents had arguments for some exemptions and against others: the three 
rulings documents, id. All three supported some exemptions and opposed others.
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Table 5: Frequency of Anti-Exemption Arguments 
 
Argument 
* = Public policy goals/outcomes 
‡ = Jurisdictional/procedural 















‡ Pro-exemption arguments fail burden of proof - 33 3 1 37
‡ Burden of proof is on those who propose exemptions - 24 3 5 32
‡ Burden of proof is high/ difficult to meet - 23 2 4 29
* Proposed exemption threatens content production - 20 3 - 23
‡ Cited pro-exemption arguments are irrelevant in this venue - 18 3 - 21
> A proposed class of works is too broad - 16 3 2 21 
‡
Must weigh decline in creative 
output against harms to 
noninfringing users 
2 13 3 3 21
>
A proposed class is wrongly 
based on traits of users, not of the 
works themselves 
- 9 3 - 12
* Alternative (e.g., analog) formats remove the need for an exemption - 5 3 2 10
* Fair use concerns are not relevant - 8 1 - 9 
* 1201 will not cause alleged negative effects on fair use - 6 2 - 8
* Intent of 1201 is to increase TPM use - 4 1 - 5
> A proposed class of works cannot be defined by TPMs - 2 3 - 5
‡ First sale concerns are not relevant - 3 1 - 4
Librarian of Congress/ Register of 
Copyrights interpret statute 
correctly 
- 2 2 - 4
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Table 6: Pro- or anti-exemption rhetoric in final rulings documents
# of sections featuring the argument 
Argument 
* = Public policy goals/outcomes 
‡ = Jurisdictional/procedural 












‡ Pro-exemption arguments fail burden of proof 12 24 21 57
‡ Cited pro-exemption arguments are irrelevant in this venue 10 16 11 37
‡ Must weigh decline in creative output against harms to noninfringing users 4 11 7 22
* Alternative (e.g., analog) formats remove the need for an exemption 2 9 8 19
*
Proposed exemption threatens content 
production 4 9 4 17
> A proposed class of works is too broad 5 8 3 16
>
A proposed class is wrongly based on 
traits of users, not of the works 
themselves
5 7 4 16
‡ Burden of proof is on those who propose 
exemptions 3 9 3 15
* 1201 intends to preserve fair use 4 6 3 13
>
Proposed class of works is defined 
properly 1 7 3 11
*
Without an exemption, 1201 will shrink 
fair use 2 4 4 10
‡ The pro-exemption side meets its burden 
of proof 3 4 3 10
EXEMPTIONS APPROVED/DENIED 2/10 4/25 4/25 6/35282
TOTAL NUMBER OF SECTIONS 
 
22 38 39 99
88
282 Both 2003 documents consider the same proposed exemptions; their totals therefore match 
and we only count one set in the final total.
